Long Distance
Trains: Sinkhole or Scapegoat?
Midwest Rail Report
December 2001
By Richard Harnish, Midwest High Speed Rail Coalition
"People don't
understand long distance trains. They think only in terms of
Chicago to Seattle or Chicago to Oakland. Those trains serve
manydifferent markets as they cross the country." - Paul
Reistrup, Vice President, Passenger Integration, CSX
Transportation
"People forget that
trains make stops; some people get on and other people get
off." - Derrick James, Amtrak customer
Long-distance trains are commonly thought to be a holdover from
the past- a little-used, politically driven conveyance whose sole
purpose is to maintain political support for the Northeast
Corridor. Many refer to them as "cruise trains." It is
also a widely held belief that long-distance trains are the
reason for Amtrak's financial woes.
These perceptions are driving the political debate and may result
in some long-distance routes being discontinued. Since the future
of the Midwest system is linked to the future of long-distance
trains, it is important to further understand what long-distance
trains really are and what they can do.
First, a word about cruise trains. Cruise trains, such as the
American Orient Express or Rocky Mountaineer, do not provide
everyday transportation - they provide a service to a very select
market: those who are willing to pay a premium for a luxurious
train ride. Frequently the patrons fly or drive many miles just
to take the train.
Just as automotive advertisers suggest that you will always drive
on a scenic highway with no traffic, Amtrak's ads describe the
wonderful accommodations and the fantastic scenery that you will
experience when riding the train.
This contributes to the perception that Amtrak's trains are
similar to cruise trains, when in fact they are not.
Basic Transportation
Most riders travel coach. While more comfortable than flying or
driving, coach is far from luxurious. Even the first class
accommodations are spartin. The food and service levels are
typically good, but would not stand up to the scrutiny of a
person looking for a cruise experience.
Unlike cruise trains, a single long-distance train fills many
roles as it crosses the country. First and foremost it provides a
comfortable, convenient, affordable and safe way to travel for an
average of 364 people per train start.
In many cases it gets closer to the final destination than
flying, particularly in smaller towns where the airport can be
several hours away.
Often it is faster than driving, particularly on long trips.
Rail's market share remains the same, regardless of trip length.
Long-distance trains also have auto competitive times for many
trips less than 500 miles (fitting the FRA's definition of
high-speed rail.) For example, Chicago to La Plata, MO is 5 hours
10 minutes by train vs. 7 hours 30 minutes by car.
Trip lengths fill the spectrum from very short hops all the way
up to coast-to-coast journeys. The Southwest Chief, which travels
2,250 miles between Chicago and Los Angeles, makes 32 stops,
creating 528 possible trips. The average passenger trip length on
this route is roughly 1,100 miles. The other long-distance routes
also have average trips that are roughly half the route length.
Riders range from the most cost conscious traveler up to the very
well-heeled. The Chief's average fare is $130, suggesting that
most riders are using the trains for basic transportation.
Serving such a broad range of purposes makes long-distance trains
the most productive in Amtrak's system. In FY 2000 the sixteen
long-distance routes carried 52% of Amtrak's total passenger
miles. They handled 181 passenger miles per train mile compared
to Metroliners’ 178 pmtm and the Midwest Corridor's
89 pmtm.
FY 2000 Long-Distance trains v. NEC Metroliner service
| Total Pssgr miles | PMPTM | Passenger Miles | ||
| 52% | 181 | 2,800,000,000 | 16 LD routes | |
| 178 | 352,000,000 | Metroliners | ||
| 98 | Midwest corridor |
PMPTM= passenger miles per train mile
In addition to
performing basic transportation, long-distance trains are
performing other important functions: They haul mail.
They provide a strong foundation on which to build future
services. All the long distances trains in the Midwest serve
cities in the planned Midwest system. Many cities are only served
by a long-distance train. These trains provide a market base from
which to build and they protect valuable facilities needed to
operate future services.
They contribute to overhead. It is very likely that routes in the
Amtrak system either cover or come close to covering their direct
operating costs with fares. Those that do not are burdened by
inadequate infrastructure.
Cutting long-distance trains will not substantially improve
Amtrak's performance. In fact, it is very likely that Amtrak's
financial performance will deteriorate after route reductions.
They feed passengers to other trains. All of Amtrak's trains feed
passengers to and from one another. Cutting one train will reduce
usage on other trains. While there are routes that might benefit
from changes, simply reducing service will degrade the
performance of the remaining trains.
They provide broader political support. Just like the Interstate
Highway System 50 years ago, a funding program for fast corridor
trains will require a nationwide support base. That means
corridor supporters will have to join together with rural
travelers and the freight interests.
So what about Amtrak's report that the Chief lost $184.50 a
passenger in FY2000? Amtrak reports its results based on fully
allocated costs, which do not represent the true value of the
service nor the required subsidy.
Amtrak reported to Congress that the long distance trains lost
$506.1 million in FY2000 vs. Metroliner/ Acela Express's profit
of $64.7 million. These two facts make it very easy to conclude
that cutting the long distance trains would eliminate Amtrak's
appropriation.
But these numbers do not tell the whole story, partly because
they do not account for the longer trips that long-distance
passengers make. The long-distance trains accounted for 2.8
billion passenger miles compared to Metroliner's 352
million passenger miles. The long-distance trains are
providing a greater service.
These figures paint a very inaccurate picture for several other
reasons, which come in the form of unanswered questions.
Should the rest of the NE Corridor be cut? The Metroliner trains
- which carried 2.5 million passengers in 2000 - benefit from
infrastructure and economies of scale shared with other NE
corridor trains and several commuter operators. The other NEC
trains - which carried 10.6 million passengers lost $164.1
million in FY2000 and the commuter agencies pay only incremental
costs for their use of the infrastructure. Cutting the
long-distance trains will not make these costs go away.
What is included in the overhead? The Amtrak Reform Council
estimates that the NE Corridor infrastructure places an
additional burden of $300 to $600 million per year on Amtrak. How
is this cost being allocated? How is Amtrak's large management
staff being accounted for?
What about NE Corridor cost overruns? There was a cost overrun of
more than $300 million on the project to extend the
electrification to Boston and unreported cost overruns on the
Acela Express equipment order. How were these accounted for?
How much did express freight contribute to the losses? Amtrak's
ill-conceived freight program suffered large unreported losses in
FY2000. These losses would have been borne primarily by the
long-distance trains (possibly the Midwest corridor trains as
well).
Are Amtrak's trains properly serving the market? All of the
long-distance routes have only one train per day. Two of them run
only three days a week. This means that the trains stop in many
towns at very inconvenient times. Two trains a day is probably
the minimum level of service required.
Also, since little investment has been made in these routes, the
existing fleet is not large enough to handle the current demand.
Simply adding more cars to existing trains would grow ridership.
Finally, Amtrak's freight program has caused schedules to be
lengthened and continues to cause significant delays. As a
result, many trips that once worked well on Amtrak have become
uncompetitive.
Are Amtrak's operating costs reasonable? The Amtrak Reform
Council has reported that Amtrak does not measure the
productivity of its employees, does not benchmark itself with
other similar businesses and has not set
productivity goals. Therefore, we cannot judge whether or not
Amtrak's costs are reasonable.
In short, we do not know what the true demand for long-distance
train travel is. Nor do we know the true cost of operating those
trains.
Long-distance trains are under attack for being poor performers
and yet they perform better in many measurement categories than
corridor trains.
Corridor supporters, such as the MHSRC, believe that corridor
trains can perform at a much higher level by investing in
infrastructure and by creating a better institutional structure.
This is just as true for long-distance trains.
The infrastructure and institutional improvements needed to make
the corridor trains perform well are the same improvements needed
to make the long-distance trains effective.
The arguments for and against corridor trains are also very
similar for long-distance trains.
Because of these similarities, support for one type of train
creates support for the other. Conversely, attacking the long
distance trains erodes credibility and support for corridor
trains.
Allowing long distance trains to be the scapegoat ultimately
weakens the argument for fast, frequent trains in the Midwest.
