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Steam Locomotive Legislation and Restrictions in the City of New York including Kaufman Act

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Steam Locomotive Legislation, Regulations and Restrictions
in and around the City of New York: 1834 - 1930
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everything prior to and up to the Kaufman Act,
including its being found unconstitutional in 1926 and its repeal
in 1930;
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and the:

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#8835 - the Model X3-1
General Electric / Ingersoll Rand
oil-electric slow speed switching locomotive

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the first successful diesel-electric locomotive in New York City
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by Philip M. Goldstein


updated: 04 October 2025 - 20:55 CDT
update summary date location
GE / IR demonstrator 8835 catalog added 10/4/2025 1924: The Prototype X3-1: GE / IR #8835
Kaufman Act - major revelation - it was unconstitutional, overturned and repealed 9/28/2025 Steam Locomotive Regulations within the City of New York
page created: 20 September 2025








Court House


Preface
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City Ordinances
1834-1854:

New York & Harlem RR -
Fourth Avenue;
Bowery; Centre Street; Prince Street to 14th - 26th - 32nd - 42nd Street
1846-1850: 

New York & Hudson River RR
West 30th to Chambers Street
West Street, Canal Street, Hudson Street
1910:

Prohibition of the use of Dummy Engines
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
south of West 30th Street
passed            passed failed motion
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State Legislations
1902 / 1908:

Chapter 425, laws of 1903

New York Central & New York, New Haven & Hartford RR
Harlem River to East 42nd Street including the Park Avenue Tunnel
1906 / 1908:

"Saxe Law" - Chapter 109, laws of 1906
New York Central & Hudson River RR
Eleventh Avenue Tracks - West Side Improvement
1908:

The death of Seth Low Hascamp
passed           passed
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1923 / 1930:

"Kaufman Electrification Act" - Chapter 901, laws of 1923
all railroads in City of New York:
Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island,
Yonkers, Mount Vernon,  New Rochelle
Enter the Diesel-electric Locomotive So why did the railroads give up steam
if the Kaufman Act was unconstitutional and repealed?
passed, found unconstitutional, repealed

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Preface


   As many of the railroads that are covered on this website were directly impacted by the Kaufman legislation; I felt it became necessary to include a detailed explanation and history of the Kaufman Act.
There was so much more to it than simply saying "it banned steam locomotives in New York City." So, like most things on this website, the explanation has become lengthy and detailed - so grab a cup of coffee and bagel, and read on.

   The pressing reason in authoring this page; was all too often it is simply stated "steam locomotives were banned in Manhattan in 1908, blah blah blah". No... Steam locomotives were banned, but specifically in the Park Avenue Tunnel, (which is located in Manhattan); but steam locomotives were not banned anywhere else in Manhattan, or the rest of the City for that matter in 1908. Previous ordinances, were also location specific and did not entail any city wide prohibition either.

   It was then astounding for me to learn that the Kaufman Act was found unconstitutional in 1926, and repealed in 1930. Yes, REPEALED. Which means, that every time it is stated that steam locomotives are (present tense) banned in New York City, another falsehood is perpetrated. I myself, until my research, was under the impression it was still in effect. Myself and others wondered how the small terminal railroads in Brooklyn operated steam locomotives, way after the Kaufman Act was ratified. We assumed (incorrectly), this was accomplished under some exemption.

   Equally important, is while by passage of that Kaufman Act legislation undoubtedly spurred on perfection of the diesel-electric locomotive; upon the Acts' being found unconstitutional in 1926, meant the railroads were NOT forced to eliminate steam locomotive operations in the City of New York - but the railroads did so on their own accord; and for reasons of economy, not legislation. The "five year extension" in time (the second amendment to the Kaufman Act) which is often quoted as the date for railroads to comply with the Act by 1931; was no longer necessary - the Act was void. Not a single railroad article, book, blog, or website, until now; mentions this fact.


   Research into the Kaufman Act in turn required research into the other regulations and prohibitions previous to the Kaufman Act; as
a great deal of generalization, misinformation, the commingling of the separate and individual regulations, or outright omissions; complicate and obfuscate the actual wording of the regulations and restrictions and the locations specified.

   This in turn led me to realize that prior to the Kaufman Act; the New York and Harlem Railroad, the predecessor to the New York Central & Hudson River as well as that railroad itself; bore a great deal ire from the citizens and politicians of Manhattan. More so perhaps than any other railroad operation in the City of New York. Depending on how you look at it; only one of the regulations were in response to an "preventable" accident - the 1902 crash.

   The reminder of the litigation was specifically directed at and was in response to, the West Side freight operations; now considered a nuisance. Yes, there were unfortunates who were maimed or killed by the operation; but one has to wonder how anyone can get killed by a train going six, yes 6; miles an hour (that is only twice walking speed for a healthy individual); on straight avenues with plenty of line of sight; with headlight; the locomotive whistling and its bell clanging; and with an escort rider preceding the train on horseback. Since horses walk at an average of 3 to 4 miles and hour, the train cannot go faster than its horse and rider escort, or it would catch up to and run them over as well.

   Not to mention the fact that the newspapers constantly kept this "issue" forefront in peoples minds. The populace knew it was there, every day and every night. It was not obscure, or a part time operation; it was 24 hours a day, and had been in operations for decades. The trains were not hiding in a dark alley, waiting to pounce on and run over their next victim.

   It simply astounds the mind that this inattentiveness could occur back then; unlike today where distracted people with ear-buds are lost in their thoughts or busy holding a conversation and walk straight into traffic; or automobile drivers are distracted by talking on their cell-phones or busy with on board navigation systems and blow through a traffic light. Back in the 1800's and early 1900's, were men waxing their walrus mustaches and women adjusting the hoops for their dresses while they walked down the blocks and crossed the not so busy (as now) streets?

   And yet despite this distractive (and excessive) technology today causing injury and death to pedestrian and driver alike, the best that can be done is a quick Public Safety Announcement, multitudes of road signs "drive now - text later", or micro-print at the bottom of a car advertisement: "drive safe" "don't drive distracted" "professional driver on closed course - do no attempt". There are no politicians or activists like Martin Saxe, or Victor Kaufman or Ralph Nader trying to ban these modern distractions, or the automobiles that carry them in the present. But I can assure you there were people back then trying to outlaw the railroad operations, when it came to the West Side operations of the New York Central.


   As most of us have witnessed personally in the internet forums and on social media platforms; a great deal of misinformation is stated and assumed as "fact". Whether it be sports, politics, religions, famous people, infamous people, crime & punishment; or just some run of the mill information about railroads (or any other subject for that matter.)

    Specific to this topic of steam locomotive regulations and prohibitions in Manhattan and the City of New York; misinformation and misstatements abound. Whether it be a commingling of laws or just an outright incorrect and blatantly false statement. In the past, and prior to this world wide viewing, an error in information may have affected (and infected) the knowledge one or two people or perhaps at worst, a small group of people. Now with the internet; hundreds, if not thousands or even tens of thousands of viewers read the erroneous information and repeat it.

   This is now compounded by the issue that Facebook issues "awards" for making lots of posts. So some people, just share and reshare, a post to dozens if groups. All the while reposting bad information. Even if one reader corrects the erroneous information in group 'D', it is still incorrect in groups 'A' through 'C' and 'E' through 'K.'

   Some of these "persons" are actually social media "bots" often with realistic names - but are nothing more than automated programs to reshare information (or disinformation) and generate "likes" (thumbs up) for marketing purposes and traffic:
"A social bot, also described as a social A.I. or social algorithm, is a software agent that communicates autonomously on social media. The messages (e.g. tweets) it distributes can be simple and operate in groups and various configurations with partial human control (hybrid) via algorithm. Social bots can also use artificial intelligence and machine learning to express messages in more natural human dialogue.

Social bots are used for a large number of purposes on a variety of social media platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube. One common use of social bots is to inflate a social media user's apparent popularity, usually by artificially manipulating their engagement metrics with large volumes of fake likes, reposts, or replies. Social bots can similarly be used to artificially inflate a user's follower count with fake followers, creating a false perception of a larger and more influential online following than is the case.

The use of social bots to create the impression of a large social media influence allows individuals, brands, and organizations to attract a higher number of human followers and boost their online presence. Fake engagement can be bought and sold in the black market of social media engagement."

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   Whether human or computer generated; those misinformed posts, with so many people reading or even repeating the misinformation; it then becomes difficult to say the least, for others to tell fact from fiction, truth from fable. "That person sounds like they know what they are talking about." Which leaves the the remainder of the population believing it.
"It must be true, I read it on the internet." Abraham Lincoln, 1866.

   To some, this may be a non-issue, "who cares?" and apathy rears its ugly head. Well, historians do care, as well as those who want accuracy. In a society obsessed with trivia: Babe Ruth hitting 714 home runs, the most powerful handgun isn't the .44 Magnum; the fastest car; the biggest airplane; gold toilet bowls, and so on and so forth; it is up to us historians of our chosen fields to keep as many of the listeners from believing lies and half truths. This is not to say that these lies are told in a malicious way; but in most cases simply because the speaker did not know any better and filled in missing blanks with assumption, or simply repeated what they heard.


   And, as you will read this webpage, and hopefully the rest of this website as well; and absorb the information contained within; you will hopefully determine on your own, a lot of the "information" in those forums, is unfortunately incorrect and is actually misinformation. The unfortunate part of this particular topic; unlike the remainder of the pages of this website; it it can be boring. It is mostly legalese which never translates well to everyday language. "the party of the first part, categorically denies the allegations made by the party of the second part..." "I am not an attorney, but I play one on TV.."

   Obviously, when it comes to legalese, it can get muddled. So, not only have I included the original language, but where possible scans of the original documentation.

   One of my favorite quotes, is attributed to Valery Legasov;
"What is the cost of lies? It's not that we'll mistake them for the truth. The real danger is that if we hear enough lies, then we no longer recognize the truth at all."


   One can either be part of the problem, part of the solution, or part of the landscape. I choose to be part of the solution. The question is, can I convince you to be part as well?
Philip M. Goldstein

   


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A quick synopsis:
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Local City of New York Ordinances

   The first such regulations against steam locomotives were local - City of New York Common Council ordinances; prohibiting the operation of steam locomotives in a particular area for reasons of nuisance. This applies to the 1834 through 1854 regulations. But these particular regulations did notaffect operations of steam locomotive in any other part of the borough of Manhattan, or the other four Boroughs of City of New York. Mostly because, there weren't any others. The New York & Harlem was the only game in town. When those initial laws were drafted, they mentioned the specific railroad it applied to. Therefore a law barring steam locomotives of the New York & Harlem Railroad south of 42nd Street and on Fourth Avenue; had no bearing whatsoever on steam locomotives operated by the Hudson River Railroad on the Eleventh Avenue.

   It must be remembered that at this point in history, the southern terminal of the New York & Harlem Railroad was at Centre Street in what is now the Financial District, and the northern terminal was located at East 14th Street and Fourth Avenue. This was the extent of the line.

   "The cinders from that beast burned a hole in my best bonnet!" "The noise from that contraption scared my cows and they broke through my fence." "That monstrosity spews ash and smoke all over my petunias!" 

   So, the Common Council started with a regulation prohibiting steam locomotives along Fourth Avenue from 14th Street to Centre Street. This was the section that had been built and was in operation. Perhaps the Common Council was not expecting the railroad to expand so quickly, or even because it did not even expect
the railroad to survive at all. So, the regulation only specified the portion of railroad that had been built.

   As the city population gradually expanded north, and the railroad expanded north to serve it, as well as connect to Harlem, the Bronx, et al. As such, the Common Council relocated the prohibition to 26th Street, then 32nd Street and finally to 42nd Street.

   For all intents and purposes, after Vanderbilt built his first Grand Central Depot at 42nd Street, the existing (original) rail line south of 42nd became surface traction; and the line north of 42nd Street became commuter service and long distance railroad. So, there was no more steam locomotives to be operated south of 42nd Street, and the Common Council had no objection to steam locomotives running north of 42nd Street as it was all wild or farmland. At least for a few years anyway.

   I know this may seem a little confusing in todays visions of Manhattan, where everything is covered by buildings and concrete; and where we, the modern era of citizens regard the present Grand Central Terminal as the southern end of the line.

   But back then, it was for a while, the north end of the railroad line, with the south end at a terminal where the present NYC Municipal Building stands. Then, as the New York & Harlem gradually extended uptown to Harlem, and onward to points north, the station at 42nd Street became a centrally located station for the line between Harlem and Downtown Manhattan, where the steam locomotives were taken off, horses put on for the remainder of the trip to Centre Street.

   In 1873, the horse drawn line south of Grand Central Station became a separate entity and operation, and the station at 42nd Street became the southern terminal for the commuter and long distance service.
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City Ordinance: 1910 - Prohibition of use of Dummy Engines

   In 1910, the City of New York attempted to prohibit the use of "Dummy Engines" (steam locomotives with a carbody covering the locomotive.)

   The City brought action against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad to stop them from using dummy engines south of West 30th Street; by which the City claimed, that the original charter granted to the Hudson River Railroad in 1847 for the duration of 50 years, thereby said charter expired in 1897; but in that charter it stated no locomotives south of 30th Street were to be used; in which the Hudson River Railroad agreed.

   However, in 1850 and again in May 1863; the Common Council of the City New York granted permission to the Hudson River Railroad to operate steam locomotives in those streets, for the sum of $50 per per locomotive. This was further adjudicated in 1867, when a resolution by the Common Council granted a continuance of their charter
to use dummy engines.

   The City of New York was trying to establish that the New York Central & Hudson River was a separate company from the Hudson River Railroad; and therefore such rights to operate the steam locomotives did not convey to them.

   Even the attorney for the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Archibald R. Watson; stated this was not the case, and the railroad had been in fact granted permission to operate the locomotives by the City; and the fact that the City had been accepting payments for those annual licenses to operate those steam locomotives until 1909!

   Ergo, if said locomotive use was illegal, why was the City accepting payments for licensure of an illegal operation? The resolution was brought to a a vote, where it failed: 6 votes for (the comptroller of the City of New York and the Board of Aldermen) versus 10 against (including the Mayor, and all 5 Borough Presidents.)

   The Borough President of Richmond (Staten Island) then requested the Mayor request the Corporation Counsel to bring "suit in equity" to measure the question. To bring a "suit in equity" means to initiate a lawsuit seeking a non-monetary, court-ordered remedy that is based on principles of fairness and justice. Historically, this was distinct from "at law" suits, which sought monetary damages. Today, most U.S. courts have merged the procedures for both, but the distinction remains crucial because it determines the type of relief available and whether a party has the right to a jury trial.
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State Ordinance: 1902 Park Avenue Collision, legislated 1903 to take effect in 1908

   The 1902 Park Avenue Tunnel collision resulted in the State of New York passing legislation on May 7, 1903, to take effect in 1908 (five years) prohibiting steam locomotives operating in the Park Avenue Tunnels. This was a safety measure, which came about as the result of an accident.


   Therefore, steam locomotives were banned, but only in the Park Avenue Tunnels; not the entirely of Manhattan or the rest of the City as it all too often misstated. It has become a matter on relevance to discuss the specifics.

   Think of it like this: a "no commercial vehicle" restriction for a specific street, bridge, or tunnel; perhaps due to a height or weight issue. But the surrounding streets were unrestricted and suitable for operation. Ergo, do we say "trucks are banned in Brooklyn", or do we say "trucks are banned on the Brooklyn Bridge?"

   Another analogy would be, explosives are banned in the Holland, Lincoln and Brooklyn Battery Tunnels. But does that imply explosives are banned in all of Manhattan? No, and actually they are used almost every day in sub-grade construction and excavation. They just are transported in small lots over the bridges into the city. The signs at the entrances of the tunnels specify: "no explosives in tunnel"; not "no explosives in Manhattan", even though the tunnels lead to Manhattan.

   This why there are images of steam locomotives operating in Manhattan after this date.
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State Ordinance of 1906 - The "Saxe Bill" or the "Saxe Law"

   In 1906, the Governor of the State of New York, Frank Waylon Higgins (R); signed the Saxe bill, which called for the removal of the tracks from Eleventh Avenue (and other streets) as operated by the New York Central and Hudson River RR in freight service.

   The new law, put forward by Senator Martin Saxe (R), and Assemblyman Mervin C. Stanley (R); provided that the railroad tracks may be run (reconstructed) through a subway (or open sub-grade cut), or it gives the City of New York the right to condemn and take over, on payment of adequate compensation, the rights which the railroad company now enjoys on the surface of the street.

   Governor Higgins filed the following memorandum with the bill:

"The immediate purpose of this bill is to require the New York Central Railroad to remove its tracks from the surface of Eleventh Avenue, in said city, and so to terminate the present use of said avenue by said railroad, which is now operated by steam locomotive power at grade."


   The major issues with the bill, was despite the fact that the City of New York and the New York Central Railroad reached a tentative agreement, the State of New York legislature could not pass it. Therefore, the City simply did not have the financial capital to make restitution to the railroad for condemned property and make this a reality.

   Other issues were that the railroad was completely on the hook for the expense, the bill did not give the railroad authority to purchase adjoining properties to construct the said subway. Negotiations languished for many years with no resolution.
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State Ordinance: 1923 - The Kaufman Electrification Act

   In regard to the
Kaufman Electrification Act of 1923, ratified by the New York State Assembly; mandated that all railroads located in the City of New York City be electrified by January 1, 1926. This was a city wide ban enacted by the State. There are significant facts relating to the initial filing of the Kaufman Act, and resulting testimony that have either been ignored, or lost to history until now.

   The Kaufman Act, is often stated to be an environmental law, i.e.: anti-smoke or anti-pollution. But in reality, it was anti-railroad operations in the City of New York in both nature and in disguise. It was, for intents and purposes, an end move around the Saxe Law, to rid the City streets of railroad operations.
   

   A
ny violations of the Kaufman Act would incur a $5,000 per day fine, which equates to $92,564 adjusted for inflation in 2025. This fine was not a one time fine either - it was per day, per occurrence. With dozens of locomotives operating throughout Manhattan for the New York Central Railroad alone, the fines would have aggregated enormously. By nature of the specificity of the legislation, it mandated that steam locomotives be replaced by electric. No other alternative forms of power were mentioned. And without it being mentioned, any other source of power was against the specific nature of legislation. Ergo, it was electric or nothing.

   Part of the issue was at that at the time of ratification in 1923, there were no reasonable alternatives to steam power for heavy freight switching and yard work. If the Kaufman Act specified electricity or rainbow colored unicorn farts, that wouldn't have been much good to the railroads either. It was a matter of there NOT being a viable alternative to steam power for heavy freight and switching, all day long.
There were alternatives for smaller industrial railroad operations, i.e. compressed air, fireless steam, but none of these could be useful for very long without having to stop frequently, return to place of the compressor or steam boiler and re-pressurize.

   Or in the case of the gasoline mechanical, it lacked sufficient power. That was suitable for small carts or perhaps one or two full size freight cars, but not for 10 to 20 car cuts of loaded milk cars, coal hoppers or refrigerator cars loaded with ice and frozen sides of beef. A gasoline powered McKeen or Brill railroad passenger car worked well for small passenger routes, but that was a different mode of transportation entirely.


   Nothing at the time would suffice for heavy freight stopping, starting, reversing, stopping, going forward again. It would be like saying, you must use this "Model T" to haul that tractor trailer of rock. It was simply not feasible. Even trucks of that day just lacked the power to do the same.


   Even in consideration of this electric power alternative, one source was already limited by municipal regulation. The City of New York had legislation on the books that prohibited overhead trolley wire / catenary since the 1890's. Had that legislation not existed, or the City of New York been willing to repeal it; the freight railroads perhaps could have abided by the Kaufman Act. But the City was not interested in repealing or amending it.

   So the only other option in regards to electrical supply for train operation, was to install third rail in the streets. And it does not take an engineer with a degree in civil engineering to realize that running a ground level, high voltage, (read: deadly) power source in front of residential tenements, schools and parks, in front of commercial retail shops and stores; would be a good alternative. Third rail power source works in a sharply defined and segregated rights of way - not on open access city streets.

   Another factor was the time constraint imposed upon the railroads. The Kaufman Bill as originally ratified on July 2, 1923 specified that the railroads had until January 1, 1926, which equates to 2 years, 6 months. No, if's, and's or but's. And originally as filed, there were no options for an extension, even in good faith. This two years and six months may not seem like a particularity short amount of time, and if the New York Central and the other railroads operating in Manhattan owned the streets it operated on, then perhaps it wasn't. But considering every change had to go through multiple city and state agencies, it was insufficient.

   Now, the railroads might have been able to vacate their operations in that time, but at the expense of leaving a huge hole for both hauling to the commodities necessary for urban living, as well hauling the goods for the businesses that make up the City of New York's economy; or considering the railroad itself as a revenue source in regards to paying taxes and leases and franchises from the City for the right to cross city streets.

   But to install an alternative source of power in 914 days; down city avenues, across streets into alleyways, as well as build the power generating source for that infrastructure? Impossible even under the best of circumstances.

   Considering that it took the New York Central almost 8 years to acquire all the property required, raze the buildings, pay some businesses to relocate, then erect the High Line, build the St John's Freight Terminal at the southern end of it, along with everything else; south of West 30th Street. And this was only half the concession: The Central then had to excavate the sub-grade cut north to West 60th Street, including but not limited to having to purchase that land for the cut, installing temporary overpasses so as not to impede traffic, build permanent overpasses, having to shore up buildings along the route. No urban planning project of that magnitude had ever been attempted, and not at the expenditure of the railroad.

   Never the less, the railroads affected by the Kaufman legislation, wisely split their bets: they
sought legal redress through the legal system, but of which would take time, AND ordered the new diesel-electric switcher, which had just proven its worth and reliability the year prior; and just in case the courts held the Kaufman Act valid.

   The railroads were successful on both fronts: they were both allowed to keep steam as a motive power, with the Kaufman Act being deemed unconstitutional in Federal Court; as well as voluntarily replace the older technology of steam power with that internal combustion if they desired, but they were NO LONGER FORCED TO SO.

   Unfortunately, the majority of the people who talk about the Kaufman Law, whether it be on the subject of environmental, railroad operations, or just in general conversation; they do not realize that when the Kaufman Act was found to be unconstitutional in 1926, the railroads were no longer forced by a law to give up steam, BUT DID SO VOLUNTARILY.

   An analogy to this would be like stating, "Yeah, the United States enacted prohibition in 1919, with it taking effect in January 1920 with the Volstead Act - the 18th Amendment"; and then never mentioning the part about the 22nd Amendment in 1933 repealing it. It leaves the listener under the impression the law is still in effect.

   I am not ashamed to admit it, I too was guilty of this; until my research into exemptions to the Kaufman Act led me to learn what others did not know. Exemptions were no longer needed because the law was overturned. At least everyone who talks about prohibition, at least knows about the 22nd Amendment, that repealed it. In regards to the Kaufman Act, no one ever mentions it being overturned. They just go on through life citing the first event.

   So again, while the initial ratification of the Kaufman Act essentially forced the timely perfection of diesel-electric locomotives as an alternative to steam power; the repeal of the Kaufman Act meant the railroad were no longer legally required to do so, nor would they face a fine in not doing so.

   This finding of unconstitutionality is now how we know how the smaller railroads, i.e.: the New York Dock Railway and the Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, were able to continue using steam locomotives. They did not need an exemption; as the use of steam was no longer illegal due to the unconstitutionally of the Kaufman Act.

   Had the diesel-electric locomotive been perfected, say five years earlier, would the Kaufman Act have even been proposed? This is a million dollar question, but I believe it still would have been. K
eep in mind, the Kaufman Act was intended to get the New York Central off the West Side of Manhattan, from blocking pedestrian and vehicular traffic and being a general nuisance at all hours of the day and night. It probably would not have mattered to Kaufmann or his constituents. They wanted the railroad operation out of a way. Either underground, or upon an elevated, or gone totally.

   What the Kaufman Act did have positive influence on, was providing the impetus for perfecting the diesel - electric locomotive, but locomotive designers had already been on that track (so to speak and pun intended) since the 1910's. Given time, the results would have been the same, but not rushed like the Kaufman Act compelled it to.

   Let us compare the time frame of developing the diesel-electric locomotive to that of the evolution of the steam locomotive. When the steam powered locomotive was first built in the 1804, it was small, cantankerous and more of a novelty. It was not going to replace the horse, mule or human labor anytime in the immediate future.

   By the 1830's the locomotives grew in size, most of the bugs worked out of it, making it more reliable. People saw their use to carry larger trains of people or freight. The second evolution of steam locomotives did not take place until 1890-1910 where we saw a dramatic increase in size and power. Then there was the final evolution which include the super power and articulated era of 1920's through 1940's. Development was not rushed and an evolution t
ook place every twenty years or so (give or take). Steam locomotive power evolved over the course of 130 years.

   Electric locomotives evolved over a long period time as well. The first built in 1837 was powered by batteries. Ironically it was destroyed by workers who saw it as a threat to their employment. The first externally powered electric passenger train did not come about until 1879. The Baltimore Belt Line in Maryland and operated by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; was electrified in 1895. Gradually other railroads realized the benefits of electric operation, but they were not forced to do so in limited period of time that the Kaufman Act was demanding..

   The diesel powered locomotive pretty much followed the same course, just at a later point in time. Rudolf Diesel's patent was issued in 1892. The year 1900 saw the development of the oil engine as a stationary power source. Commencing around 1910 and over the next 5 years, saw an attempt to adapt the diesel engine from a stationary power source to a mobile one; and throughout 1915-1923 it was being perfected as such. But it had not just quite reached that state at this point in time.

   But with the Kaufman Act ratified in 1923, the demand for an alternative to steam and electricity was now, not later. Not because steam was unreliable, not because electricity was unreliable, but because the only option given to the railroads via the Kaufman Act was the use of electricity in an environment that was impractical and dangerous. That might work for trams, trolley and small mining applications, or on a larger scale, for heavy freight; but the City of New already had prohibition on overhead wire for trolley use; and use of a third rail was not practical.

   It was the equivalent of saying, you have to use electricity, but you can't use it here. It would have forced the railroads to relocate, and as we will learn that was the Kaufman Act's intent! It was not because of pollution or smoke, even though the act was disguised as such; but there were plenty of other sources of pollution and smoke, worse than the hundred or so steam locomotives operating in Manhattan.

   The Kaufman Act was an Assemblyman wanting to get rid of the freight railroad operating in his district; ergo, the West Side. Today, we would call it weaponization of the law.

   The Kaufman Act, for its bally-hoo and notoriety, was not in effect more than three years, from July 2, 1923 through September 10, 1926; at which time it was found to be unconstitutional by the US Statutory Court. The State of New York had overstepped its authority by trying to regulate an method of interstate commerce that was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
   
   But before I can even commence on the specific history of the Kaufman Act; I must first discuss the pre-existing, but unrelated restrictions already existing in the City of New York.










1834 - 1854: New York & Harlem Railroad
The City says no steam south of 14th Street  26th Street  32nd Street  42nd Street...
Yeah, 42nd Street.. That's where we want it!

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   The first passenger railroad to ply a route on Manhattan was the New York & Harlem Railroad, organized in 1831. Their first section of the line to open for service was along the Bowery from Prince Street north to (East) 14th Street. This opening took place on November 26, 1832. After that, the following sections opened:
  • June 10, 1833         north along Fourth Avenue to 32nd Street
  • May 9, 1834            north along Fourth Avenue to Yorkville, including the Murray Hill Tunnel
  • October 26, 1837    north along Fourth Avenue to Harlem, including the Yorkville Tunnel
  • May 4, 1839            south along Bowery, Broome Street and Centre Street to City Hall at Centre Street and Park Row.
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   Following at least one boiler explosion in 1834, fear from this incident; as well as outcry from residents along the route about the nuisance of smoke cinders, and hissing steam, which was causing a great stir among the livestock on their farms (yes, hard to believe that this area still had farmland at this point!) and in some instances where the trains were hitting cows.

   So an ordinance was passed in 1834 prohibiting the steam locomotives south of 14th Street. The steam locomotive was uncoupled from the passenger car, a team of horses brought in, hooked up and the passenger car brought south. As I understand it, if a train consisted of more than one passenger car, each passenger car needed its own team of horses, so if the train consisted of three cars, three teams of horses would be bringing three individual passenger cars south. 
"A new practice arose. At the steam terminal, at Fourth Avenue and Fourteenth street, incoming trains were broken up and one by one the cars were drawn by horses the rest of the day down to Chatham street terminal at Broadway, opposite Saint Paul's. And the horse-drawn cars, northbound, were made up into trains on reaching the steam terminal and thence drawn by locomotives..."
("Grand Central" No Place For A Railroad, by David Marshall, Whittlesley House - McGraw Hill; 1946)
   A very labor intensive and time consuming practice to say the least. Regardless of that, this ordinance only applied to the New York and Harlem's route along Fourth Avenue, the Bowery, and Centre Street (not that there were any other railroads in Manhattan at this time.)
   As this route expanded, this ordinance was later amended (date needed) to prohibit locomotives south of 26th Street.

   Then, amended again, to prevent locomotives south of 32nd Street in 1854.

   Then the New York City Common Council passed an ordinance on December 27, 1854, to take effect in 18 months (July 1856), barring the New York & Harlem from using steam power south of 42nd Street; again, due to complaints by persons whose property abutted the right-of-way.


   When this latest amendment took effect, the New York & Harlem... didn't do anything. It just kept running the locomotives. After much debate and legal wrangling, an injunction was issued preventing the City of New York from enforcing the ordinance. Then, the courts struck down the injunction on July 30, 1858 and allowed it to be enforced.

So I reiterate: this regulation only applied to the New York & Harlem Railroad operation along Fourth Avenue, south of 42nd Street.
 
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1846 - 1850: The New York & Hudson River Railroad was allowed to operate steam locomotives to West 30th! Then to Chambers Street beginning 1850.
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    By 1846, the Hudson River Railroad had been organized, applied for and received a charter to operate into Manhattan. The railroad began operating the following year along the West Side of Manhattan, where it was mostly industries, piers, docks and wharves. And a great deal of the waterfront property north of West 14th Street was unimproved. Streets and avenues simply ended at the water line.

   So while the New York & Harlem Railroad was prohibited from operating steam locomotives south of East 42nd Street (through residential and commercial areas); the Hudson River Railroad was not, and able to take its passenger trains a little further south to West 30st Street with steam locomotives.

   South of here, service between this location and Chambers Street utilized teams of horses. But it appears, only for a brief period.
 

1847 W. Williams Map of Lower Manhattan
Yellow lines and dates denote points of steam locomotive prohibition south of line location
White lines and dates denote extensions of route opened on date shown

Pink reflects the segment of track abandoned after 1868
annotated map © 2025 ~ freightrrofnyc.info
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 The following is direct quote from the 1920 Joint Report with Recommendations, p.99:
"The charter of 1846 granted the right, subject to permission from the City of New York, to build a line down the West Side of Manhattan. That permission was given the next year, and the West Side tracks were laid as part of the Hudson River Railroad.

The line handled passenger as well as freight business, inasmuch as the Park Avenue line to what is now Grand Central Station belonged to an entirely different company, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company.

The Hudson River Railroad Company established a passenger station at Chambers Street, but drew its passenger cars by horses between that point and Thirtieth Street.

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   But, as we can see by the City of New York Ordinances, resolution dated December 4, 1850 (seen at right);
"Resolved, That the Hudson River Railroad Company be, and they are hereby, permitted to propel their cars from Chambers street to Thirty-first street by their street locomotive, or "dumb engine," upon the condition that the same shall not be run at a greater speed than six miles an hour; and also, that they shall employ a proper person to precede the trains on horseback, to give necessary warning, in a suitable manner, of their approach, and be under such further directions as the Common Council may, from time to time, prescribe.

December 4, 1850



   So, the Hudson River Railroad was permitted to use a "dumb engine" (steam dummy or covered locomotive) from West 31st Street to Chambers Street; but the New York and Harlem Railroad operation along Fourth Avenue, was not.

   So, not only was the Hudson River RR now permitted to use steam locomotives, but it was in fact using them in joint freight and passenger handling to and from the Chambers Street Station until 1868.


Atlases of New York City - Manhattan - 1857
Plate 8 - William Perris Civil Engineer and Surveyor Third Edition 
Publisher: Perris & Browne
Lionel Pincus and Princess Firyal Map Division
New York Public Library Digital Collection
annotated version © 2024~ freightrrofnyc.info
added 20 May 2024


Atlases of New York City - Manhattan - 1857
Index Map
William Perris Civil Engineer and Surveyor Third Edition 
Publisher: Perris & Browne
Lionel Pincus and Princess Firyal Map Division
New York Public Library Digital Collection
annotated version © 2024~ freightrrofnyc.info

added 20 May 2024

Hudson River Railroad Station Passenger Station - 1863
Looking south-southwest. I firmly believe this image is misattributed as West Broadway & "Liberty Street"; the reason being West Broadway and Liberty Street do not intersect.
Furthermore, the buildings and geography shown in the image perfectly align with the Perris Street Atlas above at the intersection of Chambers Street and West Broadway.
The triangle where the horsedrawn drayage carts are lined up is present day Bogardus Plaza.
Nevertheless, the presence of numerous open two wheel horsedrawn carts queued after the hacks and carriages exemplifies freight transport at this station.
H. N. Tiemann photo
New York Historical Society Digital Archives
image id: NYHS PR129 b-07 327-01

annotated version © 2024~ freightrrofnyc.info
added 20 May 2024
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   Why was the Hudson River Railroad permitted to operate locomotives in the streets and not the New York & Harlem? While this is a question that needs a firm answer, I suspect that answer may be read between the lines of the Joint Report with Comprehensive Plan and Recommendations of 1920: New York, New Jersey Port and Harbor Development Commission:
The line handled passenger as well as freight business, inasmuch as the Park Avenue line to what is now Grand Central Station belonged to an entirely different company, the New York & Harlem Railroad Company.

The Hudson River Railroad Company established a passenger station at Chambers Street, but drew its passenger cars by horses between that point and Thirtieth Street.
The company's freight traffic grew to such an extent that the company was forced to find a site inland from the waterfront for a downtown terminal. On this site, at Beach and Varick Streets, was built the St. Johns Park Terminal, after which, in 1868 , the tracks south to Chambers Street were removed.

   
And so it appears, while the Hudson River Railroad engaged in both freight and passenger service, freight was its bread and butter (figuratively and literally!) Otherwise, why would it give up its passenger depot at Chambers and build an exclusive freight terminal just a few short blocks north? And the St. John's Park Terminal did not have a passenger waiting room.

   It is imperative to keep in mind at this point in time; the New York & Harlem River Railroad, was still a competitor to the Hudson River RR. It would not be until Cornelius Vanderbilt purchased both, that he brought them under the same umbrella a few years after in 1869.

In 1850 and again in 1863, the Common Counsel of the City of New York granted permission for the Hudson River Railroad to use "dummy engines"
south of West 30th Street to Chambers Street.

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1902: The Park Avenue Crash and the resulting 1903 / 1908 steam locomotive prohibition in Park Avenue Tunnel
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   Now we come to the prohibition of steam locomotives within the Park Avenue Tunnel, which was legislated  in 1903, to took effect in 1908. This was a state legislation, that was an area and railroad specific regulation, not a "city wide" ban.    

   This regulation was enacted as the result of a crash at 8:20 am on January 8, 1902 in the Park Avenue Tunnel at East 56th Street.
 A standing New York, New Haven & Hartford RR passenger train was rear-ended by a New York Central RR passenger train in the Park Avenue Tunnels leading to Grand Central Terminal.

   A total of 17 passengers were killed and 36 injured, 
due to a locomotive engineer missing a stop signal that was obscured by smoke by the train running in front of it. (Initial newspaper accounts were lower by a couple of people. The New York Times article may be viewed here.

   A moderate loss of life, and by no means the worst railroad accident (in terms of fatalities) throughout the United States, but it was for New York City.

   Never-the-less, it outraged the politicians and the public.
Some of this rage was fueled by the "penny papers", in other words; the tabloids of the era: The New York Sun, The Daily Graphic, and others. These were much like todays "checkout" tabloids: i.e.: National Enquirer, and The Star; that feature sensationalist and exaggerated headlines: "Boy trapped in refrigerator eats own foot!" "I bore Elvis' alien baby." This was in contrast to responsible and researched reporting of the New York Times, the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, and other reputable sources of news. Most of todays printed tabloids have fallen to online versions.

   Since portable photography was still not yet a widespread medium in 1902; sketch artists fill the paper with drawings; and in most cases, imaginations ran wild.



    It should also be noted, by the date of the accident and ensuing legislation, the New York Central Railroad (successor to the New York & Harlem) had already been studying and planning to electrify the Park Avenue line since 1899 ("When The Steam Railroads Electrified";  William D. Middleton, Kalmbach Books, 1974), but remained unconvinced of the technology. The Baltimore & Ohio had only completed their electrification of the Baltimore Belt Railroad a few years prior.

   Nevertheless, the Park Avenue accident spurred the Central into finally 
ordering electric powered locomotives and electrifying the Park Avenue Line (as well as several other suburban lines.)

   To prevent a recurrence of this accident, an act by the New York State Legislature on May 7, 1903; thus prohibiting the operation of steam locomotives operating in the Park Avenue Tunnels on Manhattan Island south of the Harlem River after June 30, 1908.
Chapter 425 - Laws of 1903, Section 4:

Shall not be lawful, except only in case of necessity, arising from the temporary failure of such other motive power as may be lawfully adopted, for any railroad corporation to operate trains by steam locomotives in Park avenue in the city of New York south of the Harlem river. If trains shall be operated by steam locomotives in said Park avenue south of the Harlem river for a period of more than three days, the railroad corporation operating such trains shall pay to the city of New York a penalty of five hundred dollars for every day or part of day during which such trains are so operated, unless the mayor of the city of New York shall certify to the necessity for the use of steam locomotives arising from the temporary failure of other motive power."

   The act then states that;
"the New York and Harlem Railroad, the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, and any successor companies using the railroad right of way in Park Avenue, "are hereby authorized to run their trains by electricity, or by compressed air, or by any motive power other than steam and which does not involve combustion in the motors themselves, through the tunnel and over the improvements."

   The "improvements" as mentioned refer to the terminal reconstruction itself as well as the viaduct and tunnels along Park Avenue, as well as the construction of plants for the generation of electricity and the  transmission and distribution of same to comply with Section 4.

   The rest of this legislation deals with the reconstruction of Grand Central Depot and its approaches, which required the closing of some city streets, to condemn property; some of which were necessary to comply with Section 4; and many subsequent amendments to Section 5, and 8; relate to the purchase of adjoining lots of property. The current Grand Central Terminal is the result of these purchases.

   Section 4 itself however, the section pertinent to type of motive power; was not amended.
And the State Legislation still gave them five years in which to accomplish this conversion to electric power and comply with the act.

   This act is very difficult to locate within the annals of Google Books or HathiTrust. Most of the information relating to this act comes from research performed by Joseph Brennan, so a tip of the hat is due.


   All too often, it is this particular regulation that is generalized and misattributed as to the "banning of steam locomotives in Manhattan," with the specificity of "in the Park Avenue Tunnel" omitted.

   This obviously is not the case. The 1908 prohibition of steam locomotives is specific to the tunnels in passenger service on Park Avenue, and it did not - repeat DID NOT result in all steam locomotives being banned altogether, as a whole, throughout the City of New York; whether that be solely the borough of Manhattan, or the other four boroughs that comprise the City of New York: the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island.

   If you should happen to dispute this, there are hundreds of images in many archives, the New York Public Library, Brooklyn Public Library, the City of New York Municipal Archives, New York State Library; the National Archives, the Library of Congress; and many more; that clearly show steam locomotives in operation in the City of New York in all five boroughs; during this period.

   Furthermore many authoritative books on the history of railroading in New York show these images; as well on many pages
of this website; showing steam locomotives on the streets of Manhattan between 1908 (after the legislation) and 1926 (the date the Kaufman Act was ruled unconstitutional). These images may be viewed here: and this list is just for the borough of Manhattan!

   Quite simply, I ask, if these steam locomotives were banned altogether in Manhattan after 1908 as some imply, then kindly explain how there are hundreds, nay thousands; of images of steam locomotives from multiple railroads operating on the streets of Manhattan for all those years??

   That is because the answer is, simply, steam locomotives were not universally banned in Manhattan following the 1903 / 1908 legislation as many unfortunately state.

   This law, in the authors opinion; was in fact necessary at that time.

   It would be several years of experimentation before c
ab signalling in the United States became "en vogue". Cab signalling was driven by a 1922 ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in that it required 49 railroad operations to install some form of automatic train control in one full passenger division by 1925. Several large railroads, including the New York Central, fulfilled the requirement by installing "intermittent" inductive train stop devices.

   However, the Pennsylvania RR saw an opportunity to improve operational efficiency and installed the first "continuous" cab signal systems, eventually settling on pulse code cab signaling technology supplied by Union Switch and Signal.


This 1908 regulation was specific as to the prohibition of steam locomotive operations in the Park Avenue Tunnel,
and nowhere else in Manhattan or the remainder of the City of New York, including any of other four boroughs (Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island).
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1906: the Stanley - Saxe Bill and the start of trying to remove steam locomotives and freight operations from the West Side of Manhattan

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   The Stanley-Saxe Bill, or the Saxe Bill, was the first organized attempt to force the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad from its operations on the streets of West Side of Manhattan.

   What it did was codify the legislation allowing the City through the Rapid Transit Commission and the Corporation Counsel to condemn trackage already existing in the streets as well as prevent new trackage from being built, if said railroad has not already agreed to relocate its trackage.

   Basically, it was a move it or lose it proposition. The resolution gave the New York Central 12 months to relocate its trackage at their expense. But as history has recorded, the New York Central didn't move it, nor did they lose it.
   Mervin Clark Stanley was born May 6, 1857 in New Britain, Hartford County, Connecticut.

   He was the son of Oliver Cromwell Stanley and Charlotte Stanley, née Hine.

   He became a lumber, coal and builders' supplies merchant in New Britain. On January 23, 1884, he married Martha Fenn Miles. In 1899, he relocated to New York City, and became a partner in a firm of commission merchants and exporters.

   Mervin entered politics as a Republican, and became a personal friend of Governor Charles Evans Hughes. Stanley was a member of the New York State Assembly in 1905, 1906 (New York County, 19th District) and 1907 (New York County, 15th District)

   He died on February 1, 1907, at his home at 329 West 82nd Street in Manhattan, after undergoing two operations for appendicitis; and was interred at the Fairview Cemetery in New Britain, CT
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   Martin Saxe was born August 28, 1874 in New York City.

   Martin was the son of Fabian Sachs and Theresa Sachs, née Helburn. He graduated from Princeton University in 1893.

   Saxe was a member of the New York State Senate (R) from 1905 to 1908, sitting in the 128th, 129th (both 17th District), and the 130th and 131st New York State Legislatures (both 18th District.)

   In April 1915, he was appointed to a three-year term as Chairman of the State Tax Commission.

   He died on February 5, 1967, at his home at 101 Central Park West in Manhattan.


   The Saxe bill was signed into legislation on March 26, 1906; but the lead up to it was worth

  One of the more amusing tidbits from this Saxe Bill, was the fact that Senator Saxe threatened to "resign" from the Senate if the measure failed.

   And you think a politician threatening to quit or "move to Canada" if their bill was voted down (or their political party was voted out) was new?

   Despite the revelry we will see in the next pair of New York Times articles, the matter-of-fact truth as stated by the Ira A. Place of the New York Central says it clearly:

"Ira A. Place, acting for the New York Central Railroad, has informed the members of the Board of Estimate that the ultimate result of the enactment of the Saxe bill for the removal of the Eleventh Avenue tracks will be the city will be that the City will have condemn and take over the rights and franchises which the company owns in the thoroughfare. Mr. Place estimates these rights and properties as worth $100,000,000."

   To what the cost of this victory would be to the City of New York?



   With this article, Governor Frank W. Higgins (R) signed the Saxe bill into law.

   His memorandum, quite lengthy, is not as boastful as Saxe's statements were several weeks prior.

   But again, the City and State prevailed to what degree, with the passage of this act?

   
So what did the Saxe bill really accomplish? Here, hindsight is 20/20.

   We know from history now, that the New York Central Railroad was not forced from its Eleventh Avenue street running; the City would find out soon enough that the State of New York ratified the bill, but was not interested in financing the reimbursements following condemnation proceedings.

   The New York Central would continue to operate in the streets of Manhattan for another 35 years.



   What the Saxe bill did accomplish however, was it put the railroad and the City together to at least begin to formulate a plan for the eventual removal of street operations. It did not take long for such a plan to be worked out, as we can see from the following Minutes of the Public Service Commission on Monday, August 8, 1908.



   The outline of the plan, as can be read; would pretty much be the way the New York Central would rebuild its lines commencing in 1929. This bill lays out the agreed plan for separating the railroad from grade:

   The street grid to be raised over the West 30th Street Yard; and what they call a "subway" (in actuality - an open sub-grade cut; not a passenger carrying form of conveyance like we now associated the word subway with) was to be built from West 30th Street to West 60th Street. North of the West 72nd Street, the railroad right of way, it had originally been discussed a continuation of the "subway"; however it was decided due to the cost and the terrain; the railroad remain at grade with the exception of a viaduct at Manhattan Valley from West 129 to 138th Streets. The incline leading up to the viaduct would begin at West 122nd Street and rejoin grade level at West 145th Street for the rest of the line to Spuyten Duyvil.

   The question is, why was it not accomplished? Well, if you read on page 1437; this committee and the railroad company came to a substantial agreement upon the general features of plans to be adopted but the committee in its report dated February 25, 1907, stated that in order to carry out the plan thus far agreed upon, additional legislation would be necessary.

   Another point that I find interesting, is that both George Rice, the chief engineer for the Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners; stated that the plans he drew up did not comply with the Saxe Act.
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"These were the only plans prepared by the Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners and they formed the basis of all negotiations between the board and the officials of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company. It will be observed that this plan does not comply with the provisions of the act which provides for a plan for a subway to which all tracks now operated at grade should be removed."

   This was in reference to where the Saxe Act wanted all of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad trackage sub-grade; from Spuyten Duyvil to West 30th Street. But, even Chief Engineer Rice recognized that north of West 72nd Street, it was not prudent to place the tracks sub-grade.


   What this tells me, is the Saxe Bill, while ambitious and appealing to his West Side voters; Saxe was not versed in civil engineering (few politicians are) and his demands were not feasible; and even the Chief Engineer representing the City recognized this.

   On February 19, 1907, the Mayor requested of the railroad company, assurance that if legislation should be passed enabling the plan to be carried into effect, that the railroad company would be prepared to proceed according to the plan. This assurance was given by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad in a letter dated February 20, 1907.

   So, the City of New York and the railroad had reached a tentative agreement. It was the State of New York that had other plans.

A bill designed to authorize the plan was introduced in the legislature but failed to pass, with the result that the procedure prescribed by the Saxe Act was left in force.

The Saxe Act prescribed by Section 4 that in case the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners should be unable within twelve months to come to an agreement, then condemnation proceedings should be instituted.

   So, in short and if I understand this correctly;
"In case the board of rapid transit commissioners shall be unable within twelve months after this act takes effect (the act took effect March 26, 1906) to agree as herein provided with said railroad company upon a plan as contained in the preceding section and obtain the approval thereof of the board of estimate and apportionment , the said board of rapid transit commissioners shall thereupon condemn all and any rights,privileges and franchises of any such railroad company or companies to operate by locomotives using steam or other power, cars or trains for carrying freight and passengers at grade on, across, through or along streets , avenues, public parks or places of the City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, and cause the tracks of such railroad or railroads, to be removed therefrom."

   Whoa, whoa, whoa! The railroad did what was prescribed, negotiating in good faith, in that it come up with a plan to relocate; and it agreed to relocate; but since the railroad could not relocate or reconstruct without legal approval, and the State of New York could not get the legislation passed; this is certainly no fault of the railroad, was it now? And the railroad had to give up their operation because the City and State could not agree?

   The Saxe Bill stipulated that if it
"shall be unable within twelve months after this act takes effect (the act took effect March 26, 1906) to agree as herein provided with said railroad company", not if the Board of Rapid Transit Commissioners was unable to agree with the State of New York.

   Um, yeah, okay. The railroad was not going to just summarily give up land and business income worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Not gonna happen - not without some form of compensation to the railroad.
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION - FIRST DISTRICT -  REPORT FOR 1907 - pages 53-59, following excerpt from p. 55-56

Methods of Relief- Eleventh Avenue.- From the foregoing it will be seen that the mandatory provisions of the law have been complied with. But some method of sinking or elevating these tracks must be found. For many years the situation has been growing worse and worse. Children are killed, needed streets are rendered almost impassable, traffic is constantly impeded by freight trains, and a large portion of an important section of the city finds its progress retarded.

The probable award on condemnation would impose a serious burden of payment upon the city, and moreover some railroad access to the westerly part of the city to bring into market produce, meat, milk and merchandise, is desirable. The solution, therefore, rests rather in the replacement of the tracks than in their entire removal.

   The issue now, was the City of New York had nowhere near enough fiscal wherewithal to pay the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad the fair value of the railroad tracks and facilities that the City wanted to condemn. They wanted to dance, but did not have the money to pay the band.

   On top of which it was now becoming apparent, that if the City should prevail and find a way to pay the railroad to remove itself from the City of New york; millions of tons of freight and commodities that the City lived on and depended on, were not going to be brought into City as conveniently as it had been. Obviously, that would require prices to be raised to pay for the added cost of shipping into the City, from alternate locations. And rember, when this was taking place; there was Holland Tunnel (opened in 1927) no George Washington Bridge (opened in 1931) or any of the crossings opened after those.

   It was going to be unloaded at the terminals on the New Jersey shoreline and carfloated across the Hudson. This would require extra handling. Even if the items were brought over on station carfloats and unloaded directly fromthe railroad cars, still was added labor and cost.

   Now I now could go on for days quoting the related legislative back and forth filings; but any more, I might lose your interest. Why, even I am getting exasperated researching it!
And so, it went back and forth. For decades.

   Meanwhile the railroad continued doing what it was in business to do, which is haul freight, and if need be, haul it through City streets as it had to do to and as the Common Council agreed to way back in 1850. If the railroad could not be forced to move, and the City could not be pay them to move, they they were going to stay put.

   Ergo, the Saxe Bill was but a Hollow Victory:

The Saxe Bill was the first attempt to solve the West Side Problem (street running of freight trains.)

Failed.


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1908 - The death of Seth Hascamp
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   In 1908, the Bureau of Municipal Research claimed that the West Side Freight Operations trains had killed 436 people during the period of 1852 through 1908 (56 years).

   Current research proclaims this statistic to number 548 deaths and 1,574 injuries in 1910, but the actual source is not known (this number was contained in a February 18, 2015 New York Times article "New York City Rail Crossings Carry a Deadly Past", by David Dunlap.)

   While researching these statistics, I encountered a blog online that generalized the following incident.

   In 1908, a New York Times article reported that during the preceding decade nearly two hundred people had been killed, mostly children; from nearby tenements. But it was the "gruesome death" of a school boy that supposedly stirred the call to eliminate the trains from the West Side.

   On Monday, September 25, 1908; seven year old Seth Low Hascamp and a group of friends were playing "follow my leader"; of which their route included climbing upon and over the cars of a freight train that had stopped in the middle of Eleventh Avenue at the intersection of West 35th Street.

   While upon the freight cars, the cars began moving and Seth was thrown from the car to beneath the wheels and crushed. Although it has been postulated that it was illegal for trains to stop at the location in order to avoid such accidents, and the people were quick to blame
the conductor or the brakemen, who were allegedly "not be in their proper places" when the train suddenly started moving again.

   Let us analyze this for a moment. "Illegal to stop the train." What if the train had been stopped because of a pedestrian or horse and wagon in their way? Are we to presume the train was to keep going and run over the person or horse instead to abide by the regulation?

   And would this not bring us right back to where we are: an unnecessary death caused by the freight operations in the street? Whether the train was moving, or standing still; it would have still presented a danger; but an avoidable danger. A preventable danger, by not getting close to it.


   Lo & behold, that was exactly why the train was stopped
it was found that the train had been compelled to stop by a truck which was on the tracks!

  
Stop or don't stop, the railroad is damned if does and damned if it doesn't.

   It's said the "conductor and brakemen were not in their proper places".

   Were the conductor and / or brakeman hoisting a few in a neighborhood bar, while they were supposed to be on duty (and truly would have been not where they belonged)? Or was the conductor at the front of the train asking the truck to move; and the brakeman at the rear of the train, protecting the movement like they should have been; and truly in their rightful places, just not at the "right place and right time" to prevent Seth and his friends from playing on the train?

   If the train was truly "five blocks in length" (which equals 1300 feet, measuring the frontage of the city blocks along the route the train would be taking), that would have equated to 32 freight cars of 36 foot length common to that era. In my research, I have yet to see a train of 32 freight cars along Eleventh or Tenth Avenues in any of the imagery preserved from 1908. The trains are usually ten to fifteen cars at most. But let us assume Mr. Schroeder's accounting was not hyperbole or exaggeration. If the brakemen was where he was supposed to be, (at the rear of the train) he probably couldn't see Seth or his friends playing near the middle of the train. Not with horses and vehicles on both sides of the train going to an fro and the avenue, all well as regular pedestrians. Think of it like this: can you spot a friend in a city crowd from several blocks away, keeping in mind you are actually looking for your friend? 

   Remember, the neither the conductor or the brakeman was employed to be a crossing guard or a policeman. Their job was to move and control the train. Subsequently, the crew of the train involved was exonerated by the jury of the coroner, Dr. George Frederick Shrady, Jr; and blamed the accident on the child’s own negligence. 

   And in a classic case of 'the truth hurts', the coroner's decision ignited a wave of anger. A protest march was organized and held on the evening of Saturday, October 24th; where five hundred children parading in silence up Eleventh Avenue carrying placards demanding that freight trains be removed from the city streets.

   And to add further insult to injury, Mr. Schroeder marchs these children up the avenue on the very railroad tracks that presented the danger:

"to the beat of a drum and the light of fireworks (fireworks on a somber protest processional?) the little ones moved up Eleventh Avenue along the tracks of the railroad." 

   I also take note of the following sentence:

"Once, when a long freight train passed over the tracks, the procession and the congs [sic] gave way to a chorus of jeers and howls directed at the crew of the train."

   So; in fact, the trains are visible and audible at this time of evening (the march taking place at 7:00 pm, that the procession could see the train coming, and to get out of the way of it in time. Are you meaning to tell me the train didn't just jump out of a dark alley or side street in a flash and run them over? Furthermore, in the interest of safety, should not the protest be held on the sidewalks in front of the railroad yard, or better yet in front of corporate headquarters of the New York Central Railroad at Grand Central Station? Because marching them up a busy thoroughfare at 7 pm seems like a much better (and more dramatic) choice.

   Henry Schroeder, (also referred to as Mr. Schneider in the newspaper article above) was the secretary of the newly formed “Track Removal Association,” and he went on record that on dark winter afternoons an average of three school children were killed every month. Tragic as this was, and still would be in the present day; children cross in front of buses; dart out from between parked cars; and take uneducated risks that they aren't aware of. Younger children, haven't accrued the necessary experiences of recognizing hazards. Parents and guardians can only do so much to teach youngsters the hazard of crossing a street, or playing where they shouldn't.

    If this was truly the case; why didn't Mr. Schroeder raise the necessary funds and hire crossing guards during these dark winter afternoons to protect the children at intersections where the train ran; like schools do today adjacent to busy thoroughfares? It is a very simple premise, and would have eliminated or at least curtailed the problematic situation; as he declared it to be.

   But in retrospect, those crossing guards, had they been hired and in place are at designated intersections. If Seth and his friends were mid-block, between two crossing guards; the guards might have missed them too.

   What cannot be alleviated, is the natural inquisitiveness of children that draws them to industrial objects (including myself) when we were younger. What we do know for fact, is children explore abandoned buildings, sit in abandoned cars pretending to drive, climb on standing railroad equipment, place pennies on the rails, light fireworks with short fuses; hitching a free ride on the back of city buses to beat the fare. 

   The list of potential hazards that could result in injury, or worse; is endless. 

   Let me relate the following personal experience. When I was 8 years old, and the Blizzard of 1978 hit New York City with 30+ inches of snow; the side streets were impassable in Brooklyn. My friend and I built a tunnel network under the snow in the street. We took snacks into the tunnels and had a blast. Not long after, my father found out and he was livid. After he calmed down, he explained to me what could have happened when the city snow plow would have come down the street? Obviously, we wouldn't have been seen in the snow tunnel and likely would have been crushed to death. It was then, and only then; did that fun evaporate and replaced with images of pain and dismemberment.

   Would it have been my fathers fault had I been killed? Would it have been the fault of the driver of the Department of Sanitation plow truck? Was it mine? In my mind; yes, it would have been, because I was responsible (or irresponsible) for my own actions. But remember, I too was the same age as young Seth. I, like him; did not have the experience in life at the age of eight; to recognize a dangerous / fatal situation in a seemingly innocuous one. My friend and I were simply having fun at the time.

   I will not get into the debate of, "Where were Seth's parents?", "Why wasn't he in school?" (it was a Monday), or if the parents did or did not attempt to educate him to the rationale of "if your friends jumped off a bridge, are you going to jump too? The natural and innocent inquisitiveness and carelessness of youth is to blame for young Seth's death. My father just happened to be coming out to shovel our sidewalk. What if he wasn't? Would I be here today writing this?

   Seth could just have easily fallen out of a window or off the tenement roof playing the game. Would there have been as much outrage then? Would some person use Seth's death to champion a "cause" against a landlord as much as they did against the freight train operations on the West Side?

   In short, we see that todays modern reaction is to blame someone else for these failings, existed back then as well. 

   We as a society, attempt to educate youth to the dangers of illegal drugs; driving while distracted; caving to peer pressure; etcetera and so forth. But, quite honestly, we fail.

   Why? Because society has not learned from its mistakes. And it will not. Currently, there is a resurgence of these risky acts of derring-do; adolescents and teenagers in New York City and all over the globe are "subway surfing"; that is climbing on top of moving subway cars and trains and riding on the roof while the train in moving. More than several have been injured or killed when they struck the tunnel roof, overpasses or fell off the moving train.

   But does present day society demand the abolition of New York City subway service as a result? No. A few attempt to lay blame with the New York City Transit System, and demand the transit system be proactive with installation of (even more) gates; fences; locking the doors of the subway cars so the perpetrators can't egress to the roof between cars. (But then these same people complain when the doors are locked preventing them from leaving a crowded car or in case of an emergency.) People demand the installation of video surveillance cameras; hiring more police; along with other knee jerk but equally useless reactions. You can hire 100,000 more police, but will they be in the right place at the right time? Most often not. These juveniles are known to go to extreme lengths to perform the subway surfing. They climb on the roofs of elevated stations to reach the subway cars roofs. Any obstacle placed in their way, they will find a way to circumvent. 

   In today's era; we see some of the viral postings online involve hitching a ride long distance on freight trains, trying to emulate the romance of the rail during hobo days. Back then, most hobos rode the rails seeking employment during the Great Depression, not for fun. They knew they could lose their lives from slip or fall, or at the hands of a particularly brutal conductor. Today's "hobos" ride "to do it", and to podcast their adventures.

   But we also bear witness to other foolhardy "dares" where juveniles (and some young adults) give into "challenges" posted on viral media, et al: biting into laundry detergent pods "the Tide Pod Challenge"; "sunburn art"; "Nyquil chicken"; walking in the street blindfolded a/k/a "bird box challenge." 

   It is not the fault of the laundry detergent or cough medicine manufacturers Medical professionals have been warning people for decades about the dangers of smoking. Yet, despite those warnings some elect to do it anyway. Some do it to look cool. Some do it to fit in. They weren't forced to do it; they did so voluntarily. In the case of cigarettes or or drugs or alcohol; those substances have the added danger of addiction.

    Simple fact of the matter is, these deaths occur from nothing more that the very human trait of free will (and foolishness). The rush of adrenaline from these feats of daring do, showing off to friends and strangers; are to blame for the subway surfing incidents. In short, we see and like to think that todays modern reaction to blame someone else for these failings; existing back then, as well.  

   And yet the news is still full of tales of lives taken too early, children and adults alike. Adult vehicle drivers too impatient to wait at a grade crossing, go around the gates and get hit by the train. Under-trained commercial tractor-trailer drivers bottoming out on railroad crossings, getting stuck and then getting struck. People taking a short cut and walking on railroad tracks; and some of them wearing earbuds listening to music and don't hear the train blowing its horn.

   Nor were / are these deaths the fault of the New York Central Railroad freight operations back in 1908, nor is it the fault of the New York City Transit System or the freight railroads of today.

   But obviously back then, like now, it is easy to blame the railroads and accuse them of fault or negligence. "I didn't hear the locomotive blow its horn." "The conductor and brakemen were in the wrong place." "Why does the railroad go through the center of town, where it's busiest?" 

   Blame the railroad, because it is easier than taking responsibility for one's own actions. 

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1910 - Board of Aldermen attempt in prohibition of "Dummy Engines"

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    On June 24, 1910, the City of New York Board of Aldermen attempted to prohibit the use of "Dummy Engines" by the New York Central Railroad.

   As discussed in many pages of the website; the steam dummy or dummy engine was a steam powered locomotive with a wood carbody enclosing and covering the locomotive:

   This was supposedly done to prevent the frightening of horses, which would cause the horse to rear, buck or run amok.

   Supposedly, horses had became
conditioned to the use of square bodied streetcars (as the horses used to pull those cars before electricity, as well as being commonplace in large urban metropolises.

   Whether this actually held true, remains to be determined by an animal behaviorist. This author, having lived in rural Upstate New York; and now living in rural Texas; I can say with increasing regularity; I have personally seen people on horseback, on the shoulder of busy town or even county road. Cars approach these horses a hell of a lot faster than these steam locomotives did at 6 miles an hour; and they do not seem to be easily spooked.

   Irregardless, steam locomotives with their reciprocating pistons and rod movement apparently would spook some horses; so the locomotive was covered in a dummy carbody.
 
   This was common on many passenger and freight railroads that operated on the street, and was not specific to operations in  New York City.

   However, the use of steam dummies / dummy engines was more prevalent in urban situations as there was more interaction between the actions and operation of the railroads with horse drawn wagons, as well as horses being used by the solitary person for transportation.

   
The City brought action against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (in an attempt) to stop them from using dummy engines south of West 30th Street; by which the City claimed that the original charter granted to the Hudson River Railroad in 1847 for the duration of 50 years, thereby said charter expired in 1897; but in that charter no locomotives south of 30th Street were to be used; in which the Hudson River Railroad agreed.

   However, in May 1863; the Common Council of the City New York granted permission to the Hudson River Railroad to operate steam locomotives in those streets, for the sum of $50 per per locomotive per annum. This was further adjudicated in 1867, when a resolution by the Common Council granted a continuance of their charter to use dummy engines.

   The City of New York was now trying to establish that the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad was a separate company from the Hudson River Railroad; and therefore such rights to operate the steam locomotives were not conveyed to them.

   Even the attorney for the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Archibald R. Watson; stated this was not the case, and the railroad had been in fact granted permission to operate the locomotives by the City; that a resolution adopted by the City of New York Board of Estimate in 1907 acknowledged such activity; and the fact that the City had been accepting payments for those annual licenses to operate those steam locomotives until 1909!



   If said locomotive use was illegal, why was the City accepting payments for licensure of an illegal operation? The resolution was brought to a a vote, where it failed: 6 votes for the measure (the comptroller of the City of New York and the Board of Aldermen) versus 10 against (including the Mayor, and all 5 Borough Presidents.)

   The Borough President of Richmond (Staten Island) requested that the Mayor request the Corporation Counsel to bring "suit in equity" to measure the question. To bring a "suit in equity" means to initiate a lawsuit seeking a non-monetary, court-ordered remedy that is based on principles of fairness and justice. Historically, this was distinct from "at law" suits, which sought monetary damages. Today, most U.S. courts have merged the procedures for both, but the distinction remains crucial because it determines the type of relief available and whether a party has the right to a jury trial.



Another attempt to "evict" the freight operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad. Failed.
Even the Corporation Counsel Archibald Watson stated, the railroad was within its rights to operate, as the City had granted them permission to do so.
The Mayor and all 5 Borough Presidents agreed.

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Kaufman - Straus Electrification Act:

1923 June 1 legislated to take effect January 1, 1926
1924 amendment to expand scope of area  NYS approved
1925 April 13 amendment - "Thayer Bill" for 5 year extension NYS vetoed
1925 December 31 temporary injunction NYS approved
1926 March 26 permanent injunction NYS decision reserved
1926 May 18 amendment for 5 year extension NYS approved
1926 September 9 overturned by US Court unconstitutional US approved
1930 State legislation NYS repealed

Yes, you read correctly - it was found to be unconstitutional and overturned, then subsequently repealed.
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   The Kaufman Electrification Act of 1923; was an attempt for an outright ban on all steam locomotive operations throughout the City of New York, to include all five boroughs: (Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island). It was later amended in 1924, to include the adjoining municipalities of Yonkers, Mount Vernon and possibly New Rochelle in Westchester County on the northern edge of the Bronx.

   All operations: whether they be freight or passenger, yard service, line haul or terminal, or private industrial operations; were to be converted to electric operation.


   
While the Kaufman-Straus Electrification Act today is simply known as the Kaufman act, it did actually have two, bi-partisan sponsors:

   Recently elected Assemblyman Victor R. Kaufmann (R) 7th District, NY and Senator Nathan Straus, Jr. (D) 15th District, NY

   Note the spelling difference between Kaufmann's name (two N's, which is how his name is spelled, and opposed to the spelling of the Kaufman Act. with a single N. It is seen spelled both ways in official documents. For the sake of this website, reference to the Act will be spelled with a single N, but reference to Mr. Kaufmann himself will be with two N's.

   Born on March 14, 1896, the son of Edward Kaufmann and Sarah Rossman. His father Edward was County Clerk of Kings County for several years and chairman of the Municipal Tax Commission.

   Victor attended DeWitt Clinton High School, Far Rockaway High School, and Cornell Law School, graduating from the latter in 1918. He also graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, after a special three months course. During World War I, he served as an ensign in the United States Naval Reserve.

   In 1919, Kaufmann was admitted to the bar.  In 1921, Kaufmann was elected to the New York State Assembly (R), representing the 7th District of
New York County (Manhattan).

   While in the Assembly, he sponsored the Kaufman Act in April 1923. He
served in the Assembly until 1924 and was also chairman of the Assembly's military affairs committee in 1924.
   
   Kaufmann served as Deputy Attorney General of the State of New York from 1925 through 1931. He was a member of the New York State Executive Committee in 1928. He began serving as assistant clerk of the Assembly in 1936. he was also secretary of the Republican New York County Committee when Kenneth F. Simpson was chairman.

   In the 1942 election, he was chairman of the Dewey Volunteers, a nonpartisan organization that worked to elect Thomas E. Dewey as Governor of State of New York.

   He passed away on February 5, 1943 while under an operation for an abdominal issue. He was survived by his wife Anna, and a daughter Shirley Ann.

   
  Nathan Straus Jr. (1889–1961) was a Democratic politician and journalist who served in the New York State Senate from 1921 to 1926.

   He was the son of Nathan Straus, a co-owner of Macy's department store and a prominent philanthropist, and Lina (née Gutherz). He attended Princeton University as well as the Heidelberg University.

   He worked as a reporter of the New York Globe from 1909 through 1910; and was also editor of Puck Magazine from 1913 through 1917.

   During World War I, he served as an ensign in the United States Navy. after the war, he became Assistant Editor of the New York Globe, but left in 1920 because of that publications support for Republican presidential candidate Warren G. Harding. Instead, Straus entered politics as a Democrat, and was a member of the New York Senate from 1921 through 1926.

   During his three terms, he introduced legislation of mandatory automobile insurance, female inclusive juries, and ratification of the Child Labor Amendment.

   Straus chose not to run for reelection in the Senate in 1926. Straus was married to Helen (née Sachs), daughter of Bernard Sachs, a neurologist for whom Tay–Sachs disease is named and member of the Goldman-Sachs family. They had four sons: Nathan Straus III, Barnard Sachs Straus, Irving Lehman Straus, and R. Peter Straus.

   On September 13, 1961, Straus was found dead in a motel room in Massapequa, New York. According to his family, he suffered from a heart condition, and it was determined that he died of natural causes. He is buried at the Mount Pleasant Cemetery in Hawthorne, New York.



 The first inkling that Kaufmann was up to something appeared in the April 7, 1923 edition of the New York Times. This is very first mention of it I can find in the New York Times.

MAY BAR STEAM TRAFFIC

Assembly Committee Reports Bill to
Electrify Riverside Drive Freight
Tracks


Assemblyman Kaufmann's bill to require electrification of the New York Central freight tracks along Riverside Drive has been reported favorably by
the Assembly Committee of Public Service. It is generally believed at the Capitol that the bill has a good chance of passage.

The measure would require that the change be made by Jan. 1, 1926.
The Public Service Commission would be empowered to prescribe the
location, elevation, and kind of wires and safety devices to be used by the railroad.

   
So, from this first announcement, it appeared that the scope of the Kaufman Act only pertained to the area of Riverside Drive (north of West 81st Street) which would have made limited to the New York Central's West Side Freight Operations.

   Kaufmann represented the Seventh Electoral District of Manhattan's West Side, so his interests in this legislation pertained directly to his constituents. Kaufmann appears to have been vehemently opposed to the operations of the New York Central, on the basis of its street operations on the West Side of Manhattan.

   By the next mention in the news of this act, was published almost two month later in the June 2, 1923 issue of the New York Times
; and by this date the legislation appeared to now affect all the railroads and all the areas on New York City, not solely for those adjacent to Riverside Drive, Manhattan.

   This expansion to include all of the City of New York, must certainly have attracted the attention of the railroads.




   The Kaufman ActChapter 901 of the Laws of 1923, was an amendment to the Public Service Law (Chapter 480 of the Laws of 1910), and now prohibits steam operations in the entire City effective January, 1, 1926:


Chapter 901 §53a

Section 1. Chapter four hundred and eighty 
480 of the laws on nineteen hundred and ten 1910, entitled "An act in relation to the public service commission and the transit commission, constituting chapter forty-eight 48 of the consolidated laws," such title having been so amended by chapter one hundred and thirty-four 134 of the laws of nineteen hundred and twienty-one 1921, is hereby amended by inserting therein a new section, to be section fifty-three-a 53a, to read as follows:


§53a. Electrification of railroads in certain cities.

"No railroad corporation, operating a railroad or part thereof within the limits of a city of the first class having a population by the last state or federal census of one million or more, shall on or after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-six 1926, use any motive power in the operation of such railroad or part thereof within the limits of such city, except electricity to be generated, transmitted and used in such operation in a manner to be approved by the Public Service Commission.

The commission shall have power to prescribe the location, elevation, size, kind and construction of poles, wires, safety devices, conduits, and all erections, buildings, fixtures, appurtenances, and equipment used or found by the commission desirable, to be used in th electrification, maintenance or operation of such railroad or part thereof within the limits of said city.

§2. This act shall take effect immediately."




   Two additional sentences provide for the Public Service Commission to approve the equipment and state that the law is in effect immediately, that is, as of June 2, 1923; when the legislation was passed.
At the time, the City of New York was the only city meeting the specifics of the act.

   The above, forming the new section 53a of the Public Service Law, was amended twice: 

   Chapter 626 Laws of 1924 at left removes the following words "of the first class" and adds the following: "or within the limits of a city adjoining such city",
 
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Chapter 845 Laws of 1926 at right, adds the following:

"provided that the Public Service Commission may, after a public hearing, extend the time of any railroad corporation or terminal corporation operating as a railroad for compliance in whole or in part with the provisions of this section upon sufficient reason appearing therefor, no such extension, however, to be for a longer period of five years after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-six.
1926



   So, to recap; the first amendment
was to expand the geographical area of the Act to include Yonkers, Mount Vernon and New Rochelle in Westchester County - ergo, NOT within the limits of the City of New York. This amendment was of no benefit to the railroads.

   The other amendment, taking place in 1926, was to provide an extension in time upon sufficient reason. While "sufficient reason" is not elaborated upon, this amendment was a benefit to the railroads; but it was hard fough
t, and within months, unnecessary.

   It has been stated that the fine for lack of compliance was set at $5000 per occurrence. I cannot find any documentation to support this as yet, however this was not something to sneeze at.  It has been said that Governor Smith stated, if the railroads don't like it, they can "go into court".

   The railroads were only to happy to oblige, and took his advice.


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Was the Kaufman Act anti-smoke / anti-pollution, ergo an environmental act?

   Now, it has been repeatedly stated in contemporary railfan publications and conversation, that the primary reason behind the Kaufman Act was to "reduce pollution and smoke".

   Regardless of this reason or its veracity; it must be recognized that steam locomotives were but only one contributor to the smoke / pollution issue in the City of New York.


   Everything back then: residential, commercial or industrial was heated or powered by wood or coal.     And wood and coal was not exclusive of the industrial sector: 

   Therefore, it makes no sense that the Kaufman Act was an environmental act, as it addressed only one source of the pollution problem. But as we have seen time and time again on so many issues since the first rail was laid, the railroads bore the brunt of blame. 

   But, as we read, the implied reasoning behind the Kaufman legislation, was for all railroads operating in the City of New York, to have them convert to electric operation; whether that be DC third rail or AC or DC catenary. If it was good enough for the subway and elevateds, it was good for them too.


   If this is what was being thought by Kaufmann & Straus, what was not taken into consideration by them (or as it so appears), was that most of the freight operations in the City of New York took place at street level.
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No Overhead Wires / Catenary

   Furthermore, the City of New York already enacted legislation prohibiting the use of overhead electrical trolley wire / catenary since about 1890. Two reasons are stated behind the premise behind this regulation.

   The first issue, was that stray electrical current from trolley wires was corroding underground gas mains. The path of current from the trolley wire through the electric motor and to the rail needed to return to the source. But in many cases it was returning through the iron and steel pipes that carried gas for heating and illumination. This resulted in the development of the underground conduit electrical system used for trolleys in Manhattan.

   The second was part safety and part nuisance, what with all the telephone and telegraph wires strung throughout Manhattan and those that had not been placed underground yet, if a telegraph / telephone wire fell on an energized high voltage trolley wire, someone was going to get zapped.


   A lot of people, including traction and railroad historians never realized the lack of trolley wire in Manhattan. Myself included; were so used to seeing trolley car, that I never looked above them in photos taken in Manhattan. Some Manhattan trolley cars were powered by storage battery, in some limited cases by underground towing cable (like San Fransisco), but the underground conduit with sliding contacts between two fixed electric rails was the most prevalent method in Manhattan. These applications were fine for short trolleys, but they were not suitable for heavy freight railroad applications.

   Therefore, with no overhead wires allowed left only one option:
a ground mounted third rail as the only remaining option.  Now, considering almost all of the railroad operations in Manhattan were ground level and utilizing avenues and streets with significant pedestrian, animal and vehicular traffic both in the directions the trains were traveling as well as at cross streets.

   I don't know if you are one step ahead me or not (or ahead of Victor Kaufmann for that matter), but pedestrians and horses and 600-750 volt DC third rail electricity at street level do not get along happily. 
Third rail was fine for subways and elevated where passengers were kept sufficiently far enough away from the danger of electrocution by high platforms or fences; not where you are going to be walking or riding withing inches of it.

   On the technical side of the argument; every cross street would require a 60 to 75 foot break in the third rail, as well as switching from one track to another; with a resulting loss of power to the locomotive. This is eliminated in rapid transit applications via multiple unit (MU) control where each car of a train received power from front to back through built in cables. Several cars not intending to be uncoupled, make up the "unit" or train. Freight trains on the other hand, other than the locomotive(s); are meant to be uncoupled from each other: one car went to one customer, the next to another, and so on.  So, if a locomotive went between an unpowered gap, it lost power; and it would be stranded there, until it was towed by another locomotive from the other end or via a jumper cable in exigent circumstances.

   Mounted on the ceiling in the Park Avenue Tunnels, and in Grand Central Terminal; are ceiling mounted sections of third rail, that through the use of a small pantograph on either the cab roof or on the nose of the locomotives, allowed contact to be maintained through the third rail gaps; and allowing the locomotive to receive power uninterruptedly.  Obviously, out in the middle of the street there was nothing to anchor this overhead third rail to, not to mention it was construed to be in violation of the overhead wire regulation.

   And just as obviously, the many cross streets perpendicular to the route could not be closed off, as people were already clamoring about being blocked by the trains. They wanted open streets not more closed ones.

   Naturally, in light of all these limitations, the Kaufman legislation did not sit very well with many of the railroads in the New York City area, and several railroads, trunk line and independent alike, filed an appeal, these being:
  • New York Central
  • New York, New Haven & Hartford
  • Staten Island Rapid Transit
  • Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal
  • New York Dock
  • Degnon Terminal
   The Kaufman Electrification Act would, without any doubt, incur very serious financial hardships on many of the small independent contract terminals operating in the Bronx and Brooklyn, not to mention the previously mentioned safety issues of high voltage electricity in close proximity of pedestrians and horses at ground level.

   One would only need to calculate the total cost of replacing all eleven of Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal's steam locomotives (those in use in 1925, and all at the same time) with electric locomotives plus having to string trolley wire or catenary to power those electric locomotives.

   Quite simply, here is where "sticker shock" sets in.

   The Long Island Rail Road estimated it was going to cost between 25 and 40 million dollars for them to comply with the Kaufman Law. This figure translates to 463 to 741 million in 2025 dollars adjusted for inflation. That's half a billion dollars! This wasn't so much for its trunk lines of operation, as it was for its terminal operations in Long Island City, and freight sidings throughout Queens.
   
   
But the true loser however, is really the small one or two locomotive terminal like the Degnon was, which would most likely just "fold up" rather than attempting to electrify, which is exactly what it did - is sold its 1.5 mile street operation to the Long Island Rail Road.

   There is a further and deeper issue to consider: whether the individual railroad built their own (you guessed it), a coal fired electric generating station to power those locomotives, or if they were to purchase the power from a commercial source, the increased demand still would have required the building of new (you guessed it, again!) coal fired generating stations to meet the new demand. It is like robbing Peter to pay Paul. Remember, the implied purpose of the Kaufman Act was to reduce smoke pollution, when by its effect, it would have added to the problem. 

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April 13, 1925 - The Thayer Bill  & successful injuctions

   Taking into consideration that research into gas / diesel locomotive technology had yet to be perfected, which is why the Kaufman Act specified "electric" and no other form of motive power. Electricity was, at that time in 1923, the only alternative power source suitable for heavy freight switching.

   At this point in time on April 13, 1925, a bill is introduced by Senator Warren T. Thayer (R) who is advocating a five (5) year extension in the enforcement of the Kaufman Act. No doubt the railroads found a sympathetic ear with Thayer, who represented a region in Upstate New York, not the City of New York.




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It wasn't about getting of the smoke - it was about getting rid of the railroads!

   But as we will witness here, the intended effect of the Kaufman Act was not aimed at reducing pollution whether it be railroad generated or not; it was to drive the New York Central Railroad (and other railroads) operations off the West Side of Manhattan.


   This Thayer Bill immediately sets off objection by the Transit Commissioner, LeRoy T. Harkness (and I advise the reader, please pay close attention to the wording and content of his statement):



Brooklyn Daily Eagle - March 12, 1925
Transit Board Is Against Delaying Electrification Program

Transit Commissioner Le Roy T. Harkness yesterday made public a letter which he had sent to Senator Courtlandt Nicoll, setting forth the position of the Transit Commission on the Thayer bill, which amends the Kaufman act of two years ago, providing for the electrification of all steam railroads in New York City. Electrification under the Kaufman act was to be accomplished by Jan. 1, 1926. The Thayer bill proposes a five-year extension, with further extensions within the power of the Public Service Commission or the Transit Commission to grant. The commission is opposed to the Thayer proposal.

"The Kaufman act was aimed primarily at the New York Central west side freight line problem," said Mr. Harkness. "Although general in its terms, it did not take into consideration the varying conditions of railroads in the city, and therefore was too rigid. On this account I have been in favor of amending the Kaufman act, and some weeks ago I referred the matter to the Commission's counsel, General Statesbury, to draft a proper measure.

"I have examined the bill introduced by Senator Thayer, and am unable to recommend its approval. I consider it unwise and improper by legislative action to foreclose efforts toward electrification for five years. This bill is as rigid in one direction as the Kaufman act was in another. It seems to me that the better course would be to amend the Kaufman act by providing in effect that the time for electrification may be extended not to exceed five years upon certificates of the proper commission upon good cause shown."

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   So, some truth comes out at last. Kaufman's legislation was really aimed at the New York Central's West Side Freight Operations! But this shotgun approach caught other railroads in its sights, not just the New York Central.   

   A month later, the "United Neighborhood Houses" sent a telegram to Governor Smith, through their legal counsel; also opposing the Thayer bills' proposal of a delay. Looking this article over closely; we read;
"under the Thayer bill, the elimination of Death Avenue and smoke and noise nuisance on Riverside Drive..."

   Bingo.

   For those of you not familiar with the the neighborhoods of Manhattan, Riverside Drive was actually north of the street running operations along "Death Avenue"; the sensationalist moniker given to railroad street operations on Tenth and Eleventh Avenues, south of West 60th Street. Riverside Drive also runs along the western border of Upper West Side. While those familiar with the socio-economic "statuses" of various New York City neighborhoods (i.e.: Hell's Kitchen and Five Point's = bad; Central Park West, Fifth Avenue = good), some of you may not know that the Upper West Side is both elevated in its stature economically as well as socially.

   A quick Google inquiry reflects the following:

"The Upper West Side (UWS) in NYC is an affluent, primarily residential neighborhood known for its cultural and intellectual atmosphere, with residents often commuting to Midtown and Lower Manhattan. It features a high median individual income, an older median age, and a mix of upscale housing, including luxury high-rises, large apartment buildings, and brownstones."

   "NIMBYism" was no doubt at the core amongst the affluent Upper West Siders. Once again people build or buy next to a industry, find it a nuisance, then demand it be shut down or relocated. Say no more.


   As for research, I can find no more reference to the "Thayer bill", but the next reference to the Kaufman Act is this article, dated December 31, 1925; where Judge John C. Knox grants the enjoined railroads temporary injunctions preventing the enforcement of the Kaufman Acts regulations.

.

Brooklyn Daily Eagle - December 31, 1925
.
   However, before we celebrate this victory, there is this Brooklyn Daily Eagle article dated January 7, 1926 (seen at right):
"Denying the petition of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad for permission to continue the use of steam engines for hauling certain emergency and wreck trains, despite the Kaufmann [sic] law requiring electrification of all railroads in New York City, the Public Service Commission today ordered the use of oil electric locomotives instead.

This type of locomotives [sic], as well as storage battery locomotives and overhead electric systems, were authorized for all the railroads in the city.
For the Bush Terminal Company either the overhead system or storage battery locomotives were ordered. Oil electric locomotives were approved for the Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal and overhead electrics for the New York Dock Railway."
   What some might not realize, is that Bush Terminal Railroad already had overhead trolley wire powered locomotives in operation on the street trackage that they shared with streetcars on First and Second Avenues in Brooklyn. These electric locomotives augmented the steam locomotives, which were used within the yards, sidings and pier tracks. So Bush Terminal would only have to electrify the unpowered areas, the sidings and the Bush Terminal Yard between 51st and 43rd Streets, not their entire operation.

   Also, it is worth mentioning that the New York Dock Railway also had fielded a single overhead trolley wire electric locomotive back in 1903, which was sold in 1908. Whether the New York Dock Railway still had any overhead trolley wire at the date of the Kaufman fight, remains to be learned.

   It is most interesting to learn that the Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal was "approved" for oil-electric locomotives.
  
   Obviously these references to oil-electric locomotives reflect that the development of that type of locomotive power was starting to get noticed. Taking into consideration that in 1923, diesel-electric locomotive technology had yet to be perfected, which is why the Kaufman Act specified "electric". It was at that time it was legislated in 1923, the only alternative power source for a heavy duty freight switching locomotive.


   Compressed air / fireless locomotives had a short duration of usability and were light; both of these factors precluded their use as heavy freight switching locomotive; and the same could be said for storage battery locomotives. They were good for short runs and with light loads; but nothing more. 

   So, other than steam locomotive power, it appeared there was no real alternative other than electric locomotives for heavy switching service.
That is at least until 1924, following the successful testing of the prototype locomotive we are about to discuss.



.



Enter the Oil (Diesel) - Electric Locomotive:

The Prototype: Model X3-1 General Electric / Ingersoll Rand #8835 - the Diesel-electric slow speed switching locomotive


   It is generally accepted that the diesel locomotive came about in response to the Kaufman Act, with several railroads operating in the New York City area approaching Ingersoll-Rand to build a prototype diesel-powered switching locomotive. Ingersoll-Rand was already an established producer of stationary engines and power plants.

   It is also stated, incorrectly; the Central Railroad of New Jersey #1000 was the first diesel-electric locomotive. It was not, in regard to several categories.

   So much has been written on the development of the diesel-electric locomotive; it would be both foolish and unproductive to condense it and re-iterate it here. If detailed histories of these experimental locomotives, and the success stories; is of interest to you; it is contained in "Dawn of the Diesel Age", by John Kirkland. I highly recommend it. 

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First Diesel Locomotive in the World

   In 1906, Rudolf Diesel, Adolf Klose and the steam and diesel engine manufacturer Gebrüder Sulzer founded Diesel-Sulzer-Klose GmbH, to manufacture diesel-powered locomotives. 

   Sulzer had been manufacturing stationary diesel engines since 1898. In 1909, the Prussian State Railways ordered a diesel locomotive from the company.


with body panels removed showing interior

   After several test runs between Winterthur and Romanshorn, Switzerland; this diesel–mechanical locomotive was delivered to Berlin in September 1912. It had a 2-B-2 wheel arrangement (4-4-4 under the Whyte steam notation system), and weighed 207,000 pounds. The two cycle, four cylinder engine, had a 15½ " bore by 21½" stroke "Vee" engine (cylinders mounted at 45 degrees) and developed 1,200 horsepower,  powered the center four driving wheels through a jackshaft drive system, and reached a sustained speed of 62½ mph. 

   The starting system of this locomotive was somewhat complicated. A smaller diesel engine ran a compressor to get the air pressure reservoirs up to 600 to 1000 psi, and after this was attained; the reservoir air and the compressor air combined was then discharged into the main diesel engine to get the locomotive moving, basically as a compressed air engine. 

   When the locomotive speed reached 6½ mph, the main diesel fired, and the auxiliary diesel shut down. Road testing the locomotive took place in 1913 on the Swiss Federal Railways between Winterthur and Romanshorn; Switzerland revealed testing two significant deficiencies:

  1. Due to the 180 degree firing cycle and only 4 cylinders, caused serious vibration harmonics at low speed that were severe enough to result in crankshaft failure.
  2. The air reservoir and air compressor system was found to be insufficient to bring the locomotive, with a train; up to starting speed of 6½ mph for the main diesel engine to take over.

   Page 65 of "Dawn of the Diesel Age" (Kirkland) states the locomotive was moved to Prussian State Railways in Germany and operated on the Berlin-Mansfield Line in 1914

   A Wikipedia reference to a "From Steam to Diesel: Managerial Customs and Organizational Capabilities in the Twentieth-Century American Locomotive Industry" (Churella, Albert J. -1998; Princeton University Press; ISBN 978-0-691-02776-0) stated that the issues were unresolved and further trails were prevented due to the outbreak of World War I.

   Never the less, successful or unsuccessful (depending on your criteria), this locomotive is the first locomotive to use diesel compression ignition engine.

   In 1924; a diesel-electric locomotive was built by Maschinenfabrik Esslingen (Esslingen Machine Works)  with a 1-E-1 wheel arrangement (2-10-2 Whyte) for the Soviet Ministry of Railways. The locomotive went into service on the Moscow-Kursk route; and by 1933; had accumulated 350,000 miles. A diesel mechanical version was built immediately following. Both these locomotives are discussed on pages 83 and 84 of "Dawn of the Diesel Age".

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 In the United States

   Closer to home, here in the United States; both General Electric, Ingersoll-Rand had already been experimenting separately with compression ignition powered locomotives for some 8 years prior to the Kaufman Act (1923), as well as Baldwin Locomotive Works and Westinghouse Electric. 

   To be clear, small gasoline powered (spark ignition) mechanical transmission industrial locomotives, and passenger / baggage motor cars built by J. G. Brill, McKeen, EMC (Electro-Motive Corporation) and others; were already plying short-line railroads around the United States. But they were not suitable for heavy switching work. General Electric had been experimenting with gasoline engine - electric drive locomotives, but they too always came up short. 

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The first Diesel-electric locomotive in the United States

  Ironically; the Jay Street Connecting Railroad, located in Brooklyn and the smallest of the offline rail-marine terminals; had already hosted not one, but two different internal combustion - electric locomotive prototypes built by General Electric. 

   It is the second locomotive is the one we are concerned with. This was a diesel-electric locomotive built in September 1918 (JSC #4). This locomotive was actually one of three units built; one other for City of Baltimore, and one other in an armored carbody for use at the front during World War I.

   This locomotive; construction number 6206; was built with a GM50 diesel engine rated at 200 horsepower, and HM820C traction motors. The completed locomotive weighed 55 tons, and had the appearance of a steeple cab electric locomotive with and extra length cab compartment (seen at right).

   After only six months however, Jay Street Connecting returned this locomotive to GE as unsatisfactory.

   GE repowered it with a Sterling gasoline engine rated for 250 hp, and where GE then used it as a testing platform for different electrical control systems.

   In 1934, the locomotive would be completely reconstructed over a two year period by GE. 

   
   Upon rebuilding being completed in 1936, the locomotive now featured two Waukesha spark ignition oil engines (heavier than diesel), a new weight of 58 tons; and was operated as East Erie Commercial #11. It only served the EEC for four more years, ultimately to be scrapped.


   Unfortunately the initial design as delivered to Jay Street Connecting was unsuccessful, due in most part to electrical control issues, not mechanical ones. Irregardless, it was still the first diesel electric locomotive built in the United States, that saw service with a railroad.

   The more detailed history of these locomotives can be read on the Jay Street Connecting Railroad page of this website. 
.

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The first SUCCESSFUL Diesel-electric locomotive in the United States

  Returning to the specificities of the New York Terminal area, it was the (then) looming compliance date of January 1, 1926 of the Kaufman Act, which really spurred on advances and perfection with the form of diesel-electric propulsion for locomotive power. As a result, Ingersoll-Rand, constructed the following prototype, the GE-IR model X3-1, but it is better known by its construction number: #8835. 

   The locomotive was fitted with an Ingersoll inline six cylinder (10" bore x 12" stroke) diesel engine designed that utilized a block and mechanical design perfected by John Rathbun (a longstanding expert in gas, oil - distillate (similar to kerosene) and heavy oil engines, with solid fuel stream fuel injectors of the Price design (instead of air-blast). Hence the engine being known as a P-R, for Price & Rathbun. This engine developed 300 hp at 550 rpm.

   This engine in turn, powered a General Electric TDC6-200 electrical generator. The generator in turn furnished electricity to four HM840 traction motors, also manufactured by General Electric; with voltage and current being regulated using controls designed a few years prior by Dr. Hermann Lemp, formerly of General Electric and now working for Ingersoll Rand. The carbody was a left over, laying around at General Electric's Erie, PA facility. This carbody was unique in that one end, the front, was a rounded or bullet nose as was the roof; but the rear end was squared. Nevertheless, both ends contained a control stand for bi-directional operation.All told, this locomotive tipped the scales at 120,000 pounds or 60 tons.

   The first start up of this locomotive occurred on December 17, 1923. It was not exhibited for public demonstration until February 28, 1924, at the Phillipsburg, NJ plant of Ingersoll-Rand.

   Initial starting of the Ingersoll engine, if the on-board air supply was depleted, was accomplished with a Mianus gasoline powered air compressor. However, with the Ingersoll engine running, it drove a primary air compressor to maintain the 200 psi necessary for on-board storage and starting, if necessary.

   The other important factor about this locomotive, was that it utilized engine and electrical components that were already in production, i.e.: were readily available from parts sources. The engine, had already been in production for several years by Ingersoll Rand; and the engine unit required few and minor modifications to adapt it to locomotive use. The fuel injector mechanism was also produced by I-R; so parts were readily available and easily repaired if need be. The generator and traction motors were available on dozens if not hundreds of previous models of General Electric all-electric or gasoline-electric locomotives or motor cars.

   Unlike all locomotive designs prior to it; the Ingersoll-Rand design, with its B-B wheel arrangement, a rigid truck wheelbase of only 7' 2" and a 35 foot overall length; was a much more logical choice for the tight curve radius (in some cases 90' foot radius or less) as well as the repeated stop and go and idling as typical of the yard and switching operations of the various offline terminals located in and around New York City. 

   


"A" (rounded) end


"B" (flat) end
Ingersoll-Rand / General Electric Demonstrator #8835 - December 17, 1923
during testing

side elevation

interior arrangement

   Sam Berliner III (RIP), had authored an extremely knowledgeable (and enjoyable) website containing an in-depth history on the development of the oil-electric locomotive, including the resulting commercial models sold. His website contained images, rosters, and specifications thereof in great detail, however upon his passing; the website was removed from the web. I did manage to download most of the pages before it was removed. 

   Sam also related to me when I first entered this research many years ago, and had this to add and it should be noted:

 "By the way,  #1000 (and the other early diesel electrics) were NOT called "diesel-electric" (not then, anyway); they were referred to as "oil-electric".

The reason for this being Rudolph Diesel was a German, and anti-German sentiment following World War I was still running very high in the early Twenties;
so Ingersoll-Rand called their compression ignition engines "oil engines"..

.

   #8835 would be "unveiled" on February 28, 1924; to representatives of the following railroads of whom were showing interest in a diesel-electric switching locomotive. These were the Baltimore & Ohio, Pennsylvania, Boston & Maine, New York Central, Reading and the Lehigh Valley Railroads. While their men were impressed, they remained unconvinced of the design which had not seen day to day service yet. 

   So, beginning in June 1924, and for the next thirteen months; #8835 went through rigorous (and to some extent, abusive) testing on ten different railroads and three industries (to which the locomotive had been leased on a trial basis). Ironically, #8835 would come to spend quite a bit of time operating on the West Side of Manhattan along Tenth and Eleventh Avenues for the New York Central Railroad:


Ingersoll-Rand / General Electric Demonstrator #8835 - sometime between June 9 and August 23, 1924 - Tenth Avenue, Manhattan, NY
from Diesel Spotters Guide, Jerry Pinkepank / Kalmbach Publishing

.

   According to Diesel Spotters Guide, by Jerry Pinkepank, Kalmbach Publishing; the locomotive was broken in at the Ingersoll-Rand plant at Phillipsburg, NJ. The breakdown of hours of service per railroad are as follows. 

railroad conducting test hours of service dates of service remarks
New York Central 833 6/9/1924 - 8/23/1924 Placed in yard switching service (New York City West Side Yards) on July 19th for a daily recording of
performance data. In one test,  this unit was operated 24 hours per day (almost continuously),
handling 3 shifts daily from 7/24 to 8/7. Inspection of the locomotive could only occur during crew changes.

1, 2
Note: The Ingersoll-Rand record does not indicate what these loads consisted of or total tonnage pulled.
Baltimore & Ohio 81 8/25/1924 - 9/4/1924 A local freight service test was conducted on 8/29 to record performance data.
Central Railroad of
New Jersey:
35 9/5/1924 - 9/9/1924 A light yard drilling test was conducted during this period to record performance data.
Ingersoll-Rand   9/12/1924 Returned to Ingersoll-Rand for a complete inspection. Measurements were taken of various parts and
compared with the first full inspection record taken on February 12, 1924. No deficiencies noted, 
no parts needed replacing. Wear was so insignificant that it doesn't bear mentioning.

After the wrist pin, crank pin, and main bearings were set up to standard clearances, the engine was closed
up exactly as it was taken apart and returned to service.
3
New York, New Haven & Hartford 271 9/22/1924 - 11/4/1924 Yard switching service tests were conducted during this period to record performance data.
Union Freight 40 11/6/1924 - 11/8/1924 Tested in the Boston, MA area.
Boston & Maine 132 11/10/1924 - 11/20/1924 Various testing operations were conducted by this railroad.
Long Island: 362.5 11/28/1924 - 2/16/1925 Yard switching service tests were conducted 12/7/24 to record performance data.

Second period of demonstration trials was begun in which it is reported that an
additional 234 hours of testing was concluded on 2/16/25.
Bethlehem Steel 9   After LIRR - Tested for 9 hours on the Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England RR.
passenger service test 11 2/27/1925 - 2/28/1925 Two passenger coaches were pulled between Jersey City, NJ and Harrisburg, PA
(approximately 175 miles)
in a little over 11 hours to record performance data.

Reading

207 2/27/1925(?) - 3/17/1925 Received at the end of February 1925 and beginning on 3/4 participated in yard switching
service tests to record performance.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 120 3/23/1925 - 3/28/1925 Yard switching service tests were conducted to record performance.
Hoboken Manufacturers 26 3/31/1925 - 4/2/1925 Various testing operations were conducted by this railroad.
New Jersey Zinc
(Palmerton, PA)
79   Tested on the Chestnut Ridge Railway.
Alan Wood Iron & Steel
(Conshohocken, PA)
32 7/9/1925 - 7/11/1925 Steel plant yard service tests were conducted to record performance data in conjunction
with the Upper Merion & Plymouth RR.

   

   Three notable accomplishments took place during this trial phase:
.

1
  On August 14, 1924; during one of many tests by the New York Central in Manhattan; #8835 started and pulled a train of 93 cars on level track. This is not a bad accomplishment considering you only had 300
     horsepower to work with!

2   It also "partook" of a tug of war with a 60 ton 2 truck Shay type locomotive of New York Central and in use on the West Side of Manhattan; in which the #8835 won that battle due to smoother torque of the electric
    drive and greater coefficient of friction (as well as a little overzealousness on the part of the Shay's engineer, who got the Shay's wheel's slipping). Needless to say, the "Central's" men were very impressed.

3   Midpoint through its so-far successful testing, (in which it operated for seven months in almost continuous use), the locomotive was returned to Ingersoll-Rand. The engine was disassembled for examination and
     here it was seen that wear and tear was extremely minimal: .0005 inch on cylinders and .0025 on main bearings. And this from a relatively unproven design! The engine was subsequently reassembled without
     replacing, repairing or modifying a single component and returned to service.

   Without any room for doubt, it was clear that the prototype design of this locomotive proved to be durable, efficient, reliable, easy to maintain and easy to operate. 

   However, #8835 was never intended to be sold; and after demonstration, it went back to General Electric shops. Note in the diagrams above, there is no bulkhead between the engineer and the engine. It is known that production "consortium" model B3-1 locomotives would have a bulkhead (cab wall) for sound attenuation in consideration of the engineers hearing.

   This is not to say that the Baldwin Locomotive Works was ignoring this developing situation either. They too developed a diesel-electric locomotive, the #58501 in June 1925; with two Knudsen "inverted V6" engines which generated 1000 horsepower with the crankshafts of the two engines joined in a gear drive to a single generator shaft. Although the design was stated for road and yard service, the locomotive was of C-C wheel arrangement, with a rigid truck wheelbase of 12' 8" and its overall length at a stated 52 feet 1¾" and a which was more conducive of wider radius curves, road service or large relatively straight ladder yards, as opposed to the small condensed yards with sharp curves as encountered in the City of New York terminals. While this locomotive handled 1000 ton trains on .7 grade at 16 mph during testing the locomotive did not meet expectations.

The Production Model: B3-1 - the "Consortium"
American Locomotive / General Electric / Ingersoll Rand
60 ton 300 hp boxcab switching locomotive
= The first standardized commercially mass produced diesel-electric locomotive offered for sale.

.

   It was now that Ingersoll-Rand felt secure enough that it was time for commercial production of the design to commence and be sold. 

   This resulted in the production of the "consortium" American Locomotive / General Electric / Ingersoll-Rand  (a/k/a "A/GE/IR") 60 ton 300 hp boxcab locomotive, with Ingersoll-Rand supplying the power plant, General Electric furnishing the electrical components and controls, and American Locomotive supplying the carbodies.

   The first A/GE/IR unit constructed for sale was a Model B3-1: "B" denoting boxcab, "3" denoting horsepower (in hundreds) and "1" denoting body style. 

   This first production locomotive was purchased by and delivered to the Central Railroad of New Jersey's Bronx Terminal in October 1925 and was numbered 1000 by that railroad.

   This locomotive served flawlessly for more than 30 years, before being retired and preserved. This locomotive now resides in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Museum in Baltimore, MD

   This model locomotive was highly successful, and these A/GE/IR locomotives went on to further demonstrate that diesel-electric locomotives could in fact provide many of the benefits of an "electric powered" locomotive, without the cost of the railroad in having to install overhead trolley wire / catenary to power that locomotive, which was a significant expense of electrification.

   Plus, they were simpler to operate than a steam locomotive.

   So, following the success of the A/GE/IR locomotive at Bronx Terminal; several railroads ordered identical models for use at their offline terminals in the New York area, expecting the Kaufman Act to be upheld in court.

   After the Baltimore & Ohio RR ordered theirs, a slight change in body took place: a door was added at the ends and the fuel tank reoriented crosswise to the body.

Central Railroad of New Jersey  #1000 at Bronx Terminal, Bronx, NY - November 2, 1925
authors collection
  • Erie Railroad would purchase not one, but two: one for use at their Harlem Station in the Bronx and one for their West 28th Street Freight Station in Manhattan;
    (to be numbered 20 & 19)

  • Lehigh Valley would purchase one for use at their West 27th Street Freight Station in Manhattan;
    (to be numbered #100)

  • Baltimore & Ohio would purchase one for use at their West 26th Street Freight Yard in Manhattan;
    (to be numbered 1 and subsequently renumbered 195 and 8000); and

  • Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad would also purchase two: one locomotive for their 25th Street Terminal in Brooklyn (numbered 3001) and one for their Harlem Transfer facility in the Bronx (ordered as DLW #3002 but delivered Harlem Transfer #2).

   In turn, the storied success of this locomotive, led General Electric and Ingersoll Rand to build and market a "big brother" to this locomotive: a 600 horsepower (two 300 hp engines) 100 ton boxcab for heavy switching and road service, which became available in December 1925, and of which many railroads purchased, including the Long Island Rail Road and Erie. 

   Both of these models were widely received by the Class 1 railroads as road switchers as well as by heavy industrial operations such as the lumber and steel mills.

   



Meanwhile, back at the courthouse... the Kaufman Act "battle" continues...
.

.

   With a successful injunction in their pockets, allowing them to hold off the demanded changes as stipulated by the Kaufman legislation by 1926; the railroads continued the legal battle to invalidate the Kaufman Act. 

   I'm no attorney, but I take particular note of the statements by Robert S. Bayer, Deputy Attorney General; "He also pointed out that any fines imposed could be so low as to have no effect whatsoever upon the finances of the company."

   If that is such the case, why ratify a bill with a $5,000 per day fine? Why not $500? No doubt the act was to gain the attention of the railroads, but perhaps it went too far in its scope? 

   I also take note of the statement by Mr. Lyman representing the New York Central; "In discussing the electrification of the lines of the company on the west side he said that street crossings from Spuyten Duyvil to St. John's Park would have to be eliminated."

   Again here we have a supposedly anti-pollution act, when in reality its goal was to remove the Manhattan West Side Freight Operations of the New York Central.

   It is becoming more and more clear, this Kaufman Act was an end run to hasten a resolution of West Side Improvement negotiations. Of which I freely admit, were in fact dragging along, but not at the instigation or fault of the railroad; but the confused, jurisdictional morass between the various City, the State of New York and even some Federal agencies (please note not all existed in the same time frame, one agency may have succeeded another; but the agreements entered into could or could not be counted upon; and this is not to be considered a complete list):

Common Council (CoNY);  Board of Aldermen (
CoNY);  City Council (CoNY);  Rapid Transit Commission (CoNY);  Board of Estimate & Apportionment (CoNY);
NYC Parks Department (CoNY)
;  Port of New York Authority (CoNY);  Public Service Commission (CoNY); Works Progress Administration (US);  Civil Works Administration;  (US)  Public Works Administration (US)
   "Alexander S. Lyman, who argued the case for the New York Central Railroad Company, explained that the law was enacted about two and a half years ago and it was amended a year later and that the time allowed for such immense changes in the system was much too brief. In discussing the electrification of the lines of the company on the west side he said that street crossings from Spuyten Duyvil to St. John's Park would have to be eliminated, the electric locomotives would have to be obtained with a combined capacity of 120 steam locomotives, and that other changes and additions would have to be made which had been deemed impossible within the time allowed by the law.

   Mr. Lyman said the penalties fixed for failure to comply with the law would exceed $600,000 a day to his company, and that all of the officers and agents of the company would be subjected to summary arrest and to imprisonment and fines for misdemeanor. He wanted to know why steam locomotives, if they were so annoying and objectionable here, were not equally so in the rest of the State.

   Counsel for the Long Island Railroad Company told the Court that this company did the largest intra-city and suburban commuter passenger business in the United States, that its freight business was principally within the city limits, that in 1924 it moved 92,991,010 passengers on its system, of which approximately 10,700,000 were moved by steam locomotives within the city limits, and that it would cost at least $23,000,000 to accomplish the electrification demanded by the law."

   Ultimately, decision was reserved; meaning it was put off until a later date. Now, we are beginning to see procrastination on the part of the courts. Why?

.

The State of New York Capitulates

   Perhaps the Governor of New York, Alfred Smith; either was astute enough on his own (or perhaps had some cronies whisper in his ear); that perhaps the Kaufman Act legislation as written, was in fact flawed.  

   I say this, because Governor Smith vetoed the precise same measure (
the railroads requesting an extension) the previous year,
"the railroads had nearly a year to demonstrate they were attempting to comply with the provisions." 

   However, this time around he approved it because, as he stated for the record,
"that the task imposed upon the railroads is a difficult one because it involves not only the question of electrification but also that of the grade crossing removal."

   His approval also was given in consideration of the fact after an investigation by the Merchants Association of New York, that the railroads have certified to him that they have arranged for complete or at least partial compliance. 


   Certainly, nothing has changed regarding the difficulties that the railroad companies would be encounter in"electrifying" their railroads.

   Why the sudden "change of heart?" Why was "grade crossing removal" now part of the equation, when up until this present research; the Kaufman Act was supposedly about pollution and noise?

   Now, I don't know about you, buy after my 56 years (and counting) on this Earth; this has all the appearance of a classic back pedal by the politician, who has had something explained to him in terms of lost votes and diminished campaign contributions...


   As I read those comments and approval of the measure which he previously vetoed; the first thing that popped into my head was the courtroom scene where Judge Henry X. Harper (Gene Lockhart) back pedals on whether Kris Kringle (Edmund Gwynn) was really Santa Claus; after "being advised" by his political advisor Charlie Halloran (William Frawley) that if he rules that there is no Santa Claus, he's going to lose the votes of just about everyone involved in the spirit of Christmas: 


(Charlie Halloran) [sarcasm] "Tell them the New York State Supreme Court rules there's no Santa Claus. It's all over the papers. The kids don't hang up their stockings. Now, what happens to all the toys... that are supposed to be in those stockings? Nobody buys them. The toy manufacturers are going to like that. So they have to lay off a lot of their employees... union employees. Now you got the C.I.O. and the A.F.L. against you. And they're gonna adore you for it. And they're gonna say it with votes.

And the department stores will love you, too... and the Christmas card makers... and the candy companies. Oh, Henry, you're going to be an awful popular fellow. And what about the Salvation Army? Why, they got a Santa Claus on every corner...and they take in a fortune. But you go ahead, Henry. You do it your way. You go on back in there and tell them...that you rule there's no Santa Claus. But if you do, remember this: You can count on getting just two votes...your own and that district attorney's out there. [/sarcasm]

(Judge Harper) [sheepishly, shaking his head] "The district attorney is a Republican."


   Needless to say, a man can strip his gears changing opinions like that.

   If it means anything coming from me; if the decision was legitimately based on Governor Smith's actual opinion having changed based on the information he had in his hands (and not from someones bag of campaign contributions being held over his head while his other arm is being twisted behind his back) than I owe Governor Smith a great deal of respect.

 

   Even with the Governor now leaning towards your way of seeing things, it is not the moment to let your guard down. 

   The railroads continued their legal battle. Note that the New York New Haven & Hartford and Pennsylvania Railroad's were both asking for extensions. The hearings were closed, and decision reserved.


Brooklyn Daily Eagle
March 27, 1926


September 9, 1926 - Victory over Victor Kaufmann

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   September 9, 1926 was a red letter day for the railroad in the New York City area.

   The U.S. Statutory Court, (a Federal court, not State of New York) heard the case brought by the railroads and ruled that the Kaufman Electrification Act, on the whole was unconstitutional.

   It was decided by a panel of three judges: the Honorable Learned Hand of the U.S. Circuit Court who wrote the opinion, and District Judges John C. Knox and Thomas D. Thatcher.

   While the court found no case for 14th Amendment violations as asserted by the railroad (deprivation of due process - Kaufman Act fines and penalties of $5000 per day, per violation; were prohibitively exorbitant) it did find that the Kaufman Act conflicted with Federal control of interstate commerce:


"It is only necessary that Congress shall discover a purpose to occupy the field, as the phrase goes, to exclude further action by the State. When that appears, as far as interstate commerce goes, it will invalidate existing as well as all future state laws."
The opinion cites three acts of Congress, by which explicit power to regulate designs and specification of locomotives was given to the Interstate Commerce Commission, a federal agency. These acts make the very subject of the Kaufman act - the type of locomotives to be used - a matter explicity reserved for the Interstate Commerce Commission."

   The acts of Congress cited are the Boiler Inspection Act of 1911; the extension of that act in 1915, and the Safety Appliance Act of 1924, which extended the regulatory power of locomotives to include electric locomotives. 


   In simplest terms, the Kaufman Act interfered with interstate freight operations. That made it a Federal matter. 

   In all, it was relatively a quick legal fight, three years from when Kaufman introduced the legislation in 1923 to 1926 when it deemed unconstitutional. But a lot took place in those three years.


Brooklyn Daily Eagle
- September 10, 1926
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The last reference to the Kaufman Act that I can find is the following:

§53a repealed

§9. Section fifty-three-a
53a of such chapter, as added by chapter nine hundred and one 901 of the laws of nineteen hundred twenty-three, and last amended by chapter eight hundred and forty-five 845  of the laws of nineteen hundred twenty-six 1926 is here by repealed

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   This table shows all the changes in the Consolidated Laws, 1921-1930, at which they reflect there were only four hearings held reflecting upon the Kaufman Electrification Act.




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   At this point my research reaches a dead end... I can find no other references or legislation, proposed or enacted in response to the invalidation of the Kaufman Act. If there are any, please bring it to my attention immediately. I provide this document above to show there were no further amendments to the Kaufman Act.

   Now it has been stated repeatedly in various venues, discussions and forums; that there was an amendment of the Kaufman Act in which it was re-written to include diesel-electric locomotives as an option to replace steam locomotives.

   I can find no evidence of this amendment, and the list of amendments as shown above, and shown on this page do not reflect such wording. There were four filings / amendment regarding the Kaufman Electrification Act: ratification of the the initial Act, amendment (area expansion), amendment (five year extension), and the repeal. All are duly shown on this website, as recorded above.

   There was no amendment to the Act, that mentions "diesel-electric locomotives."

   Yes, history clearly shows the obvious success of the diesel-electric locomotive now allowed a second "power" option for the railroads to use in order to comply with the law, and obviously of which some railroads took this route, but the clearly stated
reason of the invalidation of the Kaufman Act was its unconstitutionality based on federal powers having authority, not state; and no mention of the diesel-electric power is mentioned.
"The decision is based on the grounds that the act infringes upon the legislative preserves of the Federal Government in the field of interstate commerce."

   Nowhere does it say, an alternative or less polluting method of propulsion had been developed to replace steam power.

   Further reinforcing this finding, is I can find no other City or State filings or appeals filed in opposition to this decision. I can find no further regulations or legislation filed by Kaufmann (he filed four bills through his tenure, the other three have no relation to transportation.)

   So let
us recap:
  • The Kaufman Act was never about reducing smoke or pollution;
    it was about the nuisance of railroad operations to wealthy residents in Riverside Park (some ways north);
    and had no reflection on solving the actual and valid nuisance and danger existing of those railroad street operations in Midtown;
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  • The invalidation of the Kaufman Act was because it infringed on the Federal jurisdiction of locomotive operations, which had a direct effect on necessary interstate commerce;
    not because the diesel-electric locomotive was perfected.

   With this being the case for the time being, the railroads were free from complying with the Kaufman Act.

   Here is a time line showing date of various legislations as opposed to the railroad demonstrator testing and taking possession of production model locomotives. You will note some of the railroads took delivery of their locomotives after the temporary injunction was granted and even after the Kaufman Act was found unconstitutional.

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Time Line of Events related to Kaufman - Straus Electrification Act

Legislations date  Locomotive trials & purchases
The draft of the Kaufman Act as originally proposed is anti-nuisance in
response to railroad activity in the Riverside Drive area by local residents and neighborhood civic organizations a/k/a "NIMBY's"
draft 1923, April
The Kaufman Act as filed, has now been expanded broadly to ban steam powered locomotives to be specifically replaced with electric locomotives, throughout the entire Five Boroughs of New York City. Signed into law, Gov. Smith and to take effect January 1, 1926 approved 1923, June 1
The first amendment to the act was to expand the area of prohibition to include Yonkers, Mount Vernon and New Rochelle (Westchester County) approved 1924,
1924, June 9 General Electric / Ingersoll Rand diesel-electric Demonstrator locomotive #8835 released to railroads,
begins on New York Central's West Side Line
The second amendment to the Kaufman Act, the "Thayer Bill"; was to extend the deadline of compliance by 5 years. Vetoed by NYS Governor Smith. vetoed 1925, May 18
1925, July 11 GE / IR diesel electric Demonstrator locomotive #8835 ends testing
1925, November 2 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives; Central RR of New Jersey #1000
at their Bronx Terminal
 and officially replaced steam locomotive #840
1925, December 26 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives
B&O #1 at West 26th Street Freight Terminal, Manhattan
A temporary injunction is issued by State of NY Court granting the railroads relief from compliance. Judge John C. Knox injunction
granted
1925, December 31
1926, January 7 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives 
LV #100 at West 27th Street Freight Terminal, Manhattan
Permanent injunction requested at argument hearing,
Judges
Learned Hand of the U.S. Circuit Court and District Judges John C. Knox and Thomas D. Thatcher.
decision reserved 1926, March 26
amendment for 5 year extension of deadline as approved by NYS Governor Smith. approved 1926, May 18
1926, June 23 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives 
DLW #3001 at 25th Street Freight Station, Brooklyn
1926, July 1 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives 
HT #2 at Harlem Transfer Freight Terminal, the Bronx
US Statutory Court finds the Kaufman Act unconstitutional, temporary injunction is made permanent. This permanently relieves the railroads from compliance.
Judges
Learned Hand of the U.S. Circuit Court and District Judges John C. Knox and Thomas D. Thatcher. Steam locomotive use is permitted and continues.
unconstitutional 1926, September 9
1926, September 26 A/GE/IR diesel electric Production Model locomotive arrives 
Erie #19 at Harlem Station / East 149th Street Freight Terminal
State of New York repeals the Kaufman Act.
Steam locomotives are not banned from use in the City of New York
and their use continues (LIRR, BEDT, NYD).
repealed 1930


   While the stated object of the Kaufman Electrification Law was to remove steam locomotive power from the streets of New York City, it could be considered successful in reaching this goal. It spurred on the advancement and perfection of a suitable replacement; the diesel-electric switching locomotive design. 

   However, as a circuitous way to get the New York Central Railroad off the streets of New York, it failed.

   It would take several more years of negotiating to make that goal a reality. And after Kaufmann's bill, he moved on to better things in politics, so it was up to others to make that goal a reality.

   Technically speaking, a law can be found unconstitutional by a court, but still remain on the books in an unenforceable state, like the Kaufman Act would do until 1930, when it was officially repealed by the New York State Legislature. Unconstitutional laws usually are accompanied by an editors note and citation to the finding of unconstitutionality.


    But, the fact still remains, the Kaufman Act was found unconstitutional, but the State of New York did not repeal it until in 1930. Therefore, there is no longer a legislation in the books prohibiting steam locomotive operations in the City of New York

    As Papa Boule says, "Fire up that engine!"


   If my estimation is correct, this belief that "steam locomotives are banned in the City of New York"; is as erroneous as the so called "ban on camelback locomotives", whereas this so called ban has been exhaustively disproven by Gregory P. Ames.

This one is 50/50 - the Kaufman Act, as legislation; failed to accomplish what it was drafted to do both on its face: remove steam locomotives from the City of New York:
(as well as fail for its hidden agenda: getting the New York Central Railroad operations off Manhattan Streets.)

Where it did succeed unintentionally, was spurring on the development of the diesel-electric switching locomotive.


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So why did the railroads still give up steam?

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   I can hear the rail enthusiast asking now, "If the railroads were victorious and successful in overturning the Kaufman Act, why did most of the railroads still switch to diesel-electric locomotives?"

   There are multiple reasons, and I will address them:



1) Cost Effectiveness in both Operation and Maintenance

   The first is a very logical but mundane fact: the same reason diesel locomotives replaced steam locomotives in the City of New York, is why railroads gave up steam locomotives in other parts of the United States as well.

   The railroads realized that the diesel-electric locomotive was more economical to operate.


   This may be a difficult thing for the "rabid railfan" to digest, as well as we are now living in a society where we are pretty much find someone else to blame; but the phase out of steam locomotives was not because it was "banned" by the Victor Kaufmann, or the Kaufman Act, but the steam locomotive was in fact an expensive and time consuming piece of equipment to maintain.

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   Cost of Operation:

   The Central Railroad of New Jersey conducted a cost analysis between #1000 (A/GE/IR 300 hp 60 ton diesel-electric boxcab locomotive) and #840 (the 0-4-0T steam locomotive)

   The first 100 days of operation of #1000, cost the Central Railroad of New Jersey $301.

   By comparison, the last 100 days of use of #840, in the same function at the same facility in the Bronx, operation of this locomotive cost the Central Railroad of New Jersey $1420.  

   For the record, #840 was in good shape, and would go on to yard switching duties at Jersey City. It was still in operation in February 1952, but would be scrapped in 1954. So, when replaced,in the Bronx, it was stil a viable piece of equipment, not some "hunk o' junk" on its last legs.

   Diesel-electric locomotives saved the CRRNJ over $1,100 in 100 days. And this was a single locomotive, at a single facility.  When you extrapolate that to an operation on the scale of the New York Central's West Side Operation, with no less than a minimum of five locomotives operating simultaneously (and frequently more in the area of a dozen locomotives operating), the cost savings realized is enormous.

   This is exemplified by the table in the General Electric catalog. 

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Daily and Long Term Maintenance & Repair
 
   The diesel locomotive did not need to be kept under steam if not being used, as a steam locomotive did. If it was done being used, a diesel locomotive could be "shut off."  

   Steam locomotives on the other hand, needed a hostler to maintain the fire during off hours of operation; and if not being used, the steam pressure was allowed to drop for the duration. This took time to get the locomotive back up to operational pressure again. 

   After operation, a steam locomotive needed to have the ashes needed to be dumped out of the ash pan. This required going back to the engine house or ash pit, as you couldn't just dump your ashes in the middle of the street. This required time. Time cost money. Diesel locomotives had no such burden.

   Furthermore, steam locomotive boilers had to be inspected every 30 days. This required "dropping the fire" (allowing a steam locomotive to go cold). This was not beneficial to their longevity. Excessive heating and contracting of the firebox and boiler between cold and hot cycles fatigued the metal, therefore keeping a steam locomotive "hot" increased reliability and reduced down time. While small locomotives gained steam pressure quicker than larger counterparts, it still took time. 

   But even these 30 day inspections still impacted on the work cycle of a steam locomotive. If a defect or breakage was discovered, the locomotive would have to be sent where the men that specialized in various fields, i.e; boiler repair; wheel balancing, truing & turning; cylinder packing, or any other of the special equipment needed for such repairs were located.

   This was in addition to not needing boiler related inspections and certifications, 30 day boiler wash outs, flue cleaning.

   In contrast, a general mechanic could repair the diesel-electric locomotive, usually on location; without the need for sending the locomotive back to a large repair shop.

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   Safety

   Furthermore,
the inherent safety factor of not requiring a boiler under pressure, is just another case for the diesel locomotive. A steam boiler is essentially a bomb with a safety valve. If the safety valve fails, or the hostler or engineer inadvertently let the water level drop uncovering the fire box? Mucho no bueno.

   If a diesel locomotive overheats or fails? It just rattled, wheezed, smoked and stopped; with no harmful or fatal effect to workers around it.


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2) Ease of Operation

   Operating a diesel electric locomotive is inherently simpler to operate than even a small steam locomotive. In a diesel locomotive, one man can control everything.

   In regards to the coal fired steam switching locomotives operated by the New York Central (and most other railroads) that were located in Manhattan, the various 0-4-0T and 0-6-0T as well as the Lima Shay's (all were coal fired) therefore they required an engineer and a fireman.

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3) They Already Invested In the Technology

    Secondly, the time and financial investment in developing the diesel-electric had already been expended. The railroads approached the locomotive builders to come up with a solution, and these companies did just that, and the railroads placed orders for the purchase of these locomotives in 1926. For the railroad to revert back to steam operation, is equivalent to taking a giant step backward. Yes, we rail enthusiasts all love steam locomotives and they are romanticized and nostalgic, but the steam locomotive is costly to operate.

   Again, what most rail enthusiasts do not comprehend, is that the railroads are in business to make money, and in the process of making that money also involves the saving money. "A penny saved is a penny earned." If the railroad could save 10 cents an hour in the cost differential between operating and maintaining a steam locomotive as opposed to diesel-electric locomotive, that savings averaged out over years and across a fleet of locomotives, and applied to various locations where the locomotives were use, that 10 cents added up exponentially.

   This was exemplified by the use of anthracite culm (waste) as a fuel instead of sized anthracite by the Eastern railroads. Culm was cheaper by the ton than its equivalent in screened and sized coal. The initial cost (in both time and effort) in developing a firebox in which to burn it efficiently, was secondary to the cost savings that would come later.

   This logic can be viewed time and time again throughout railroad history, i.e.: the switch from wood fired locomotives to coal fired. Then, where plentiful and readily available, came the progression to oil fired steam locomotives. Saturated steam gave way to superheated steam. Better valve designs made for better steaming efficiency. As locomotives became heavier, wheel arrangements grew larger, locomotive weights went up and so did the tractive effort. Trains became longer. The resulted in the evolution of rail and rolling stock, 36 foot cars of wood body and steel underframe, gave way to 40 foot cars entirely made of steel. Rail weights increased from 75 pound per yard to 90 pounds per yard then 115 pounds, and eventually all the way up to 156 pound rail. As metallurgy, rolling and hardening methods improved, saw a decrease in the standard rail weights to 115 and 132 pound.

   In the diesel-electric locomotive era, this can be seen as well, where four or five, or even six, 1500 horsepower diesel-electric locomotives gave way to three or four 2000 horsepower units. These in turn were replaced by two or three 3000 horsepower locomotives. Now two 4000 to 4400 horsepower locomotives are the norm for normal train operations.
Technological advances even proved that 6000 horsepower diesel locomotives were possible, but uneconomical.

   Freight train crews started at around five personnel: conductor, engineer, fireman, and usually two brakeman. With automatic telemetry "end of train devices" or EOT's; a caboose was no longer needed (eliminating the expense of maintaining that piece of rolling stock) and the elimination of at least one of the brakeman. These days, a 10,000 foot train operates with two locomotives and a conductor and engineer. (We will not discuss the ramifications of the proposed one man train crew.)

   Modern diesel locomotives have autostart technology, that when environmental conditions are favorable, they shut down the engine to save fuel, and reduce emissions. When brake reservoir pressure for holding the train in place begins falling off, or the ambient temperature is dropping, the engine automatically starts to run the air compressor and/or keep the engine block from freezing.

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4) Hedging of Bets

   There is also the possibility however remote; that if New York State or any other city, state or federal agency for that matter; attempted to curtail steam locomotive use; the diesel-locomotive was now held as an acceptable alternative in addition to electric. Precedent had been set.

   This turned out be unnecessary, but who knew at that time - history might have turned out differently.


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5) Being a Good Neighbor

   Considering the fact that steam locomotives do in fact pollute the air "more visually" than a diesel-electric locomotive; using a diesel-electric locomotive led to better relations with the public, especially so for those operating railroads in close proximity to residential neighborhoods.

   This was the "good will" factor.
Three parties are more or less content; the residents no longer complaining to the City or municipality in regards to nuisance claims and having to take legal action, and the railroads are for the most part left free to operate with minimal interference.

   Todays hot-button topics are trains blocking railroad crossings; horn use late at night or in high rail traffic areas e.g: "quiet zones"; and the transport of hazardous materials through occupied areas.

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6) Ulterior Political Motives to be Considered

   While the often stated reason for the Kaufman Act was supposedly "anti-pollution" (smoke & noise); the initial wording of the act only specified electric locomotives as an alternative, and specified electrification of the part of the line through Riverside Drive area, not the entire City.

   Subsequent newspaper articles reflect that the initial reasons the Kaufman Act was filed was because of nuisance complaints by Upper West Siders.

   Therefore, the act had nothing to do with pollution.


   And when I encountered the following testimony; it was like an epiphany. I personally cannot help but think Harkness literally let Kaufman's cat out of the bag in his March 1925 testimony:

"The Kaufman act was aimed primarily at the New York Central west side freight line problem," said Mr. Harkness. "Although general in its terms, it did not take into consideration the varying conditions of railroads in the city, and therefore was too rigid. On this account I have been in favor of amending the Kaufman act, and some weeks ago I referred the matter to the Commission's counsel, General Statesbury, to draft a proper measure."

   Again, Kaufman's and Straus' electoral districts and constituents were West Siders. The fight to get the New York Central Railroad to relocate or remove their street operations had been in discussion since 1909. No doubt the residents of the West Side had lost their patience.

   On April 13, 1925, the "United Neighborhood Houses" sent a telegram to Governor Smith, through their legal counsel; also opposing the Thayer bills' proposal of a delay. Looking this article over closely; we read
"under the Thayer bill, the elimination of Death Avenue and smoke and noise nuisance on Riverside Drive..."

   Riverside Drive was north of the street running freight operations along "Death Avenue" (the sensationalist moniker given to street operations on Tenth and Eleventh Avenues, south of West 60th Street.)

   Riverside Drive commences at West 72nd Street and proceeded north until West 181st Street in Washington Heights, a distance of 5.4 miles. Its location is somewhat aways from the hotbed of street running freight trains tying up pedestrian and vehicular traffic in Midtown.

   While there were in fact several railroad crossings at various streets perpendicular to Riverside Drive, there was no switching or yard activity along this section of line; therefore transiting this area were "through trains", and henceforth this section of line was not subject to excessive waits and gridlock like experienced in Midtown; much like the railroad crossings that existed along the line in Westchester County.

   The crossing and streets remained open; until a train approached, then opened again after it passed within a minute or two. Track speed was 30 miles an hour or better. Trains did not sit blocking the streets while switching and reversing back an forth in Midtown. 

   Furthermore, the railroad right of way in the Riverside Drive area was clearly defined and separate from roads and streets and sidewalks. So, why were a bunch Upper West Siders getting on the band wagon?

   So, it now clearly appears that NIMBYism was at the core amongst the affluent Upper West Siders and the Kaufman Act. Riverside Drive was then, and is still known for the affluent high rent apartments and condominiums built there. They did not incur an inconvenience from a train blocking a street like it did in Chelsea (Midtown Manhattan). It wasn't about reducing pollution. It was about appeasing wealthy and vociferous residents.

   Once again, people build or buy next to an industry, a railroad, an airport, a seaport, an interstate highway; and after moving in only to find it a nuisance, and they want it shut down or relocated. Say no more.
The railroad was routed through the area in 1846-1850. The Riverside area then was wild, undeveloped land. The Midtown residents that were better off financially, and wanting to escape the congestion of Midtown living, now looked to move further north, to where there were views of the majestic Hudson River.. untamed parklands.. then "Wooo, wooooo! Chugga chugga chugga, clickity clack, clickity clack." "What!?! A train goes through here!?!? Oh no, that won't do, no sir. Not at all. Send the train someplace else, anywhere, just not here! I'm going to write my assemblyman."

   It should be noted, for the record; the City of New York, the State of New York and the New York Central had been negotiating and dickering over the solutions to the West Side issue for decades. As soon as the Central and the City found a solution, the State came in and said it was no good, they wanted control over the matter and wanted something else. More or less, it resulted in a grand state of confusion which it could not be determined which municipal agency had jurisdiction:

"In 1911 (chapter 777 of laws of 1911) the West side Improvement was made the subject of special legislation, and the carrying out of the improvement was left generally for direct action between the City authorities and the railroad company. Under the Mitchel Administration plans for carrying out the West Side Improvement were developed in great detail, but at the last the proposed arrangement failed of approval. In 1917, the special legislation of 1911 was amended to confer certain jurisdiction of the (state) Public Service Commission for First District (chapter 719, laws of 1917).

The statutory authority now is so confused that little can be down until that confusion is eliminated.

Following the failure of accomplishment under the Acts of 1911 and 1917, the City Administration began litigation to test the title of the railroad company to the property occupied by its tracks. This litigation resulted unfavorably to the City (City of New York vs. New York Central R. R. Co., 234 N. Y. 113).

Toward the close of 1923 the New York Central Railroad Company made application to the Transit Commission for the elimination of all the crossings on the West Side under the provisions of the Railroad Law. The Commission found that the confused legal situation, coupled with the lack of adequate State appropriations, prevented effective action."


   The Central would agree to the States' request; and now the City wanted something else, something more. And for quite some time, the New York Central kept agreeing to finance those growing requests. It went back and forth for months, months turned into years, years into decades.  It was like trying to hit a moving target. Surprisingly, according to the recorded negotiations, the Central was repeatedly agreeable to the mounting costs. 

    The residents of the West Side elected a man who vowed to get the New York Central to relocate or cease operations altogether. But let us face it, if Kaufmann went on record with his sights set on only the New York Central (as others had done prior to him), he would get no farther than the others before him.  

   So it is my opinion here, that he disguised his attack on the Central's operation as something much more palatable and sympathetic to a wider audience as well as the courts, that being anti-pollution; and with that he took a "shotgun approach" in that his attack now applied to all the railroads operating in New York City.

   In todays parlance, we call it "going nuclear".  Everybody loves a good "David" (Kaufmann) versus "Goliath" - (the big bad railroads owned by their multi-millionaires) versus the ambitious, young, fledgling politicians striking a blow for the disenfranchised people. Of whom those people living in Riverside were not very disenfranchised - but were spoiled and used to getting their way, whether by paying for it, or screaming louder!

    It makes for good copy, and makes for easier re-election. But only when
successful.


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   8) But the Kaufman Act did not solve what it set to solve. Which was, to remedy the West Side Problem; and that fell to the West Side Improvement Project
   
   Despite the effect of getting steam locomotives out of New York City, which might have been successful to a degree; 

the issue still remained that freight trains had continued to operate on, and block City avenues and streets on the West Side of Manhattan, from Beach Street all the way to West 60th Street, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Avenues, West Street, Canal Street and Hudson Street.

   And they would continue to do so in Manhattan until 1941. This problem would only begin to be remedied, when finally in 1929, the City of New York, the State of New York and the New York Central Railroad came to terms with a viable plan. Finally a plan that made everyone happy.

   The City of New York allowed the New York Central Railroad to acquire the necessary properties to the tune of approximately $50,000,000; which numbered 350 lots, in which 640 buildings or structures had to be demolished. Of those, 181 were directly related to the building of the elevated "High Line" viaduct itself.

    And, the City, the State and the New York Central agreeing in principal to finance various portions of it - it was not left up to one entity to carry the sole burden. The cost to the City was approximately $5,000,000 or ten percent of the railroads' portion and most of that was in the way of giving up some land or land rights, not actually putting up liquid capital towards construction. Ironically, after it was built, for what little the City had to outlay, the City stated it didn't have the finances, and New York Central absorbed the cost, again, in good will.


   But all this took time. The High Line opened in sections: West 30th to West 14th Street in 1933; and West 14th Street to the new St. John's Park Freight Terminal in 1934. This High Line was an elevated private right-of-way freight line for the segment of operations between Beach Street in lower Manhattan and West 30th Street Midtown.

   The second part of the West Side Improvement Project consisted of a sub-grade cut (another private right-of-way)
for the section of West Side Line from West 60th Street to West 36th Street opened to freight service in 1937. The railroad would finance the building of an elevated structure to carry Eleventh Avenue and some side streets over the West Side Yards, which the City would get back some land.

   But even despite the opening of the High Line and the subgrade cut,
the "West Side Problem" was a situation that would not be remedied in full until July 1941, when all previous street level customers receiving service from the New York Central West Side street operations were relocated or reconstructed to receive service from the High Line, or they simply went defunct. Only then did the Railroad remove the rails in the street, ending 140 years of railroad freight service via the City streets. For the detailed history on this, I direct you to my webpage on the  New York Central's West Side Operations.

   Coincidentally, another misconception was that the High Line fully electrified as some believe. In actuality, third rail territory only extended to West 30th Street and Tenth Avenue to the Morgan Parcel Post Building. Trackage south of that location was not equipped with third rail, which meant the use of diesel-electric locomotives (with battery operation for in building sidings.) Ironically, that third rail power on the small segment of the High Line did not not last long either; from 1933 to around 1955. This also is addressed on the
New York Central's West Side Operations page.

   The diesel-electric locomotive was such a leap forward in technology and convenience, that it just was not necessary to use an electric locomotives in such a limited area. That and the growing exodus of industries from the West Side due to residentialization, and the resultant ever increasing property taxes.


   Further north and returning to the vicinity around Riverside Drive; a big deal was made about how the New York Central tracks, which had now been electrified with third rail; now "separated" the residents from the Hudson River shore line, where many places existed for recreation including swimming, boating and fishing. Only a few cross streets actually ran west of, and past Riverside Drive to the waterfront, of which these locations were grade crossings: West 72nd, West 77th and West 96th Streets.

   More than a few foot bridges existed as well, allowing pedestrians access to the waterfront; these being located at between West 82nd and West 83rd, at West 86th, West 92nd, between West 101st and West 102nd; with West 107th Street being a grade level pedestrian crossing. At worst, a 50 car freight train  equating to 1800 feet in length, traveling at 30 miles an hour, took 41 second to pass a crossing. At 15 mph it took 1 minute and 22 seconds. Hardly what I would call a long wait. Especially so considering how in the present day we can wait 2 or even 3 minutes for the traffic light to change at a crosswalk!

   Then in the 1930's, Robert Moses came in and proposed constructing an esplanade over the railroad tracks, effectively making another railroad tunnel under the park to run the trains in. Residents naturally loved the idea!

   That is until Moses filled in the land between the railroad and the waterfront, and built the Henry Hudson Parkway. So the residents now found themselves blocked from easy access to the riverfront, once again. Not by train, but by a multi-lane high speed thoroughfare. They went from having to look at a railroad, to now watching automobiles. Automobile traffic and the resultant exhaust fumes, traffic back ups with honking.. It was quite the trade off (sarcasm). You can't blame the railroads for this one!



9) Not all the railroads converted to diesel-electric locomotives:

   It must also be remembered, not all the railroads that were party to opposing the Kaufman Act dieselized as a result. For some it was still in their best interests to electrify, or even keep operating steam locomotives.

   The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad was no stranger to electrification. It had been experimenting with either third rail and / or overhead catenary supplied electric power since 1895. Since most of their main route leading north from the Bronx to points in New England had already been electrified in 1914; they simply viewed the installation of catenary on the Bay Ridge Branch and Bay Ridge Yard in Brooklyn in 1927, for all intents and purposes; as an extension of electrified territory. Electric catenary was already installed and in use across the Hell Gate Bridge to Fresh Pond Junction (interchange with the Long Island Railroad) since the bridge opened in 1916.

    Actually the installation of catenary made New Haven operations somewhat simpler, as now an electric locomotive could be assigned in Bay Ridge which would take the train all the way north to the New England states; where previously, steam locomotives were used from Brooklyn to the Oak Point Yard in the Bronx, to be changed for electric power.

   The Staten Island Rapid Transit, or more perhaps more aptly, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad which owned the SIRT; opted to electrify as well. They electrified the twenty miles of the SIRT system, at a cost of $7,000,000.
When adjusted for inflation to 2025 equals $129,590,400.

   The Delaware, Lackawanna & Western went through the expense of electrifying their small off-line rail-marine
Wallabout Terminal in Brooklyn in 1926. They purchased power from the Brooklyn Rapid Transit power generating station directly next door. This operation lasted 15 years in this configuration, only to have the US Navy usurp the property in 1941 for an expansion of the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

   The 
Degnon Terminal located in Sunnyside, Queens and directly adjacent to the Long Island Rail Road's Sunnyside Yards; sold their railroad operation: two small steam locomotives and all 1.5 miles of track; to the Long Island Rail Road in 1928. The Long Island Rail Road, first used steam powered switching locomotives from its own stable or those sent by its parent; the Pennsylvania RR. LIRR would purchase diesel-electric locomotives in growing numbers over the next few decades, but they would not phase out revenue steam operations until 1955.

   The 
New York Dock Railway would continue to operate their steam locomotives as well. They would eventually convert their roster of locomotives from steam to diesel in 1951 with their purchase of five General Electric 44 ton centercab switchers, 20 years after the Kaufman Act extension was set to expire, had the Kaufman Act remained in effect.

   The
Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal continued to operate steam powered locomotives even longer - until 1963; when they too would dieselize with their initial purchase of four (eventually to add two more, making a total of six) used American Locomotive Company model S1 switchers.

   Returning to Long Island Rail Road steam locomotive operations before I close out this chapter - perhaps as further proof that the Kaufman Act had in fact been nullified;







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Epilogue

   Most of this intricate history has been lost to time; but it is quite clear from reading all of these legal actions (and others), that the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad was the target of a great deal of ire on the part of the City. No doubt there was a safety issue running the freight trains at street grade; but after all, trolleys (which actually caused more deaths on the streets of the City); and later automobiles operated on the streets as well.

   But no one demanded the trolleys or automobiles to be moved underground - and quite the opposite - the City invested in traffic lights, policemen that acted as crossing guards, and designated crosswalks. The City found a way to keep the pedestrians safe and keep the trolleys and cars moving freely. If a person got hit by car while crossing against the light or jaywalking mid-block, it was a tragedy none-the-less, but no one looked to sue the operator of the trolley or automobile or force the trolleys or automobiles from the thoroughfares. There were 119 deaths in 2024 in all of New York City (5 boroughs), from interactions of pedestrians vs. vehicles. On average around a hundred people a year die from this  cause.

   Approximately 548 people died from the street operations of the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad for the
period from over 56 years 1910. The Bureau of Municipal Research claims that  436 persons were killed by the West Side Trains for the period of 1852 through 1908. That averages about 10 people a year. More people are killed today by vehicles on New York City streets over 6 years; than in all of the 56 years of tabulation of the railroads' street operations. It is only now within the last few years, that it has become en vogue to remove cars and buses from certain crowded New York City streets (much to the ire of motorists!)

   Yet, it was obviously acceptable back then, to demand the railroad relocate it operations; in spite of the City both granting the railroad permission to operate in those streets, and taking money from the railroad for franchises and licensure to operate in those streets all those decades. Only to have the City decide it no longer wanted the railroad operation on the streets; and have the audacity to demand the railroad pay for the relocation. It is like asking a condemned man to be executed by electric chair to pay the electric bill.

   Under normal circumstances, a one or two track tunnel might have have sufficed; after all the subways accomplished that time and time again. But considering the vastness of at least one railroad yard between West 36th and West 30th Streets, Twelfth Avenue to Tenth Avenue; to the amount of almost 3,000,000 square feet. Not to mention and all the spurs to the various industries? Add to that, the a four track sub-grade route to West 60th Street? This obviously was not going to be a simple solution like boring another two lane tube for the Lincoln Tunnel, which by no means was simple It took three years for the south and center tubes to be built, with the north tube taking 6 years between 1937 and 1945 (add two years for wartime material shortages). And it took the Interborough Rapid Transit and the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit years to build up their tunnel system (to say nothing of the Second Avenue Subway.) And the City wanted the New York Central to accomplish it in a year? When pigs fly.

   I have no qualms about saying it, the City wrongfully expected miracles and it led the people on the West Side to believe in miracles. And so we get what we see before us - decades of litigation, failed promises; and a generally piss-poor attitude towards the railroad, that the City itself fostered in the periodicals. "It's the railroad fault." "Blame the railroad." It's owned by multi-millionaires, it can afford it." It took 32 years to accomplish that goal where trains stopped operated on the City streets in (1909 -1941), of which it only took 12 years to actually build both the High Line (1929 to 1934) and the sub-grade route from West 36th Street to West 60th Street (1934 to 1937) and once the City stopped farting around; and actually let the railroad start digging.

   As a footnote, I have to add that researching the Kaufman Act was no quick and simple task.

   When steam locomotives faded into obscurity and diesel-electric locomotives became the standard throughout the 1940s and 1950's, specifics about the Kaufman Act also faded into obscurity. Adding to this was the misconceptions and commingling of various other acts and regulations among the rail community of their applications. I simply could not rely on what had been already written any longer.

   It also appears to date at the time of this writing, that no railroad historian had yet assembled a definitive history of the Kaufman Electrification Act. It was touched upon in a paragraph or two, or a quick blurb, and again usually with misinformation about both the negative and positive repercussions of said Kaufman Act upon the railroad industry. 


   That is until now.

   I sincerely hope you have found this page to be informative, concise and authoritative as I intended it to be; and to put to rest the misnomers. Please, if you have any questions, additions, corrections or comments; I encourage you to contact me and I look forward to hearing from you; so please don't hesitate to send me an email.






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